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I have based [the False Claims Act] upon the old-fashioned idea 
of holding out a temptation, and “setting a rogue to catch a 
rogue,” which is the safest and most expeditious way I have 
ever discovered of bringing rogues to justice.1 
I. Introduction 
In describing the concept upon which the forerunner to the 
False Claims Act2 was based, Senator Howard, perhaps 
unknowingly, pointed out one of the intrinsic issues of all 
whistleblower bounty programs: the innate conflict of using a 
“rogue” to catch a rogue. There is a necessary threshold 
assumption that these programs use informants they perhaps 
should not trust to catch cheats they do not trust. And therein lies 
the conflict. Whistleblowers provide an invaluable service, 
ferreting out fraud where the government simply does not have the 
access or ability to do so.3 However, in utilizing such “rogues” to 
accomplish this laudable goal, one must also realize the inherent 
need to check the possibly roguish nature of whistleblowers that 
are incentivized by bounties.  
“Imagine getting 10% for blowing the whistle on Madoff’s $50 
billion scam. ‘It’s a simple thing that will stop a lot of fraud fast.’”4 
Under the new Dodd–Frank5 whistleblower bounty program, that 
is exactly what Harry Markopolos, the whistleblower in the Bernie 
                                                                                                     
 1. CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 956 (Feb. 14, 1863) (statement of 
Senator Howard).  
 2. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006) (establishing a private right to bring 
“a civil action” on behalf of “the person and for the United States Government” 
against parties who make fraudulent claims for payment by the government).   
 3. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating 
Incentives for Sarbanes–Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 
87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 109 (2007) (“Overcoming an internal conspiracy can only 
succeed if insiders bring information about ongoing . . . fraud to the attention of 
regulators . . . .”).  
 4. Robert Chew, Calling All Whistleblowers! The SEC Wants You, TIME, 
Feb. 24, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/ 
0,8599,1881318,00.html (quoting Laura Goldman, a whistleblower who has 
alerted the SEC to fraud over thirty times).   
 5. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protections Act, Pub. 
Law No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (establishing comprehensive financial 
industry reform).  
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Madoff scandal,6 would have been entitled to. In fact, under the 
new program, 10% would be the minimum he might collect, with a 
possible reward of up to 30%.7 With hundreds of millions, or even 
billions of dollars in awards to whistleblowers at play, the 
importance of this program is apparent.  
This Note’s argument rests on the proposition that in any 
whistleblower bounty program three competing interests must be 
balanced: (1) those of the employee in reporting wrongdoing, 
(2) those of the employer in maximizing efficiency, and (3) those of 
society in encouraging the rule of law and accountability.8 This 
Note contends that the Dodd–Frank program unfairly misbalances 
these interests in a way that gives too little weight to the interests 
of the employer.  
“Whistleblower” is defined as “[a]n employee who reports 
employer wrongdoing to a governmental or law-enforcement 
agency.”9 The virtues of whistleblower programs cannot be 
understated. In 2009, whistleblower lawsuits led to the recovery of 
nearly $2 billion in frauds against the government.10 
Whistleblowers provide inside information about fraud and 
corruption that government authorities could otherwise not 
reach.11 As such, whistleblowers are an invaluable resource in any 
effective fraud-detection scheme. 
                                                                                                     
 6. See id. (“[W]histleblowers like Harry Markopolos, the private securities 
fraud investigator who dogged Madoff for years and whistled loudly . . . to 
others, both inside and outside the agency.”).  
 7. See infra Part II (explaining the new Dodd–Frank program).  
 8. Terry Dworkin & Elletta Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing: Protecting 
the Interests of the Employee, the Organization, and Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 
267, 268 (1991) (“Principled policymaking regarding whistleblowing outlets 
requires the balancing of competing interests: the employee’s interest in 
reporting wrongdoing without penalty, the organization’s interest in maximizing 
control and efficiency, and society’s interest in encouraging lawful behavior and 
public accountability.”).  
 9. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1734 (9th ed. 2009).  
 10. See Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $2.4 
Billion in False Claims Cases in Fiscal Year 2009; More Than $24 Billion Since 
1986 (Nov. 19, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/ 
November/09-civ-1253.html (“Of the $2.4 billion in settlements and judgments 
obtained in fiscal year 2009, nearly $2 billion was recovered in lawsuits filed 
under the False Claims Act’s [whistleblower] provisions.”).  
 11. See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2002) 
[hereinafter Bucy, Private Justice] (“No matter how talented or dedicated our 
public law enforcement personnel may be nor how many resources our society 
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However, whistleblowing, and in particular whistleblower 
bounty provisions, are subject to abuse and criticism.12 A 
whistleblower “bounty” provision offers the whistleblower an 
award for reporting wrongdoing. Often the amount of the award is 
set as a percentage of the total recovery that results from the 
information.13 This gives whistleblowers an enormous economic 
incentive to report violations.14 While this incentive can often serve 
to overcome the myriad of negative effects that result from 
reporting misconduct (such as retaliation, ostracism, and career 
stagnation), it can also lead to severe abuse (such as meritless 
reporting in the hopes of a huge payday).15 To combat these 
competing issues, any whistleblower bounty program needs to 
have certain restrictive policies in place. Essentially, the extreme 
economic incentive of the bounty must be tempered by certain 
principles of confinement in order to restrict meritless or otherwise 
unnecessarily harmful reporting.  
To best discover what some of these principles are, this Note 
analyzes the Dodd–Frank program in a comparative light with 
several other whistleblower bounty programs and predicts how it 
will affect businesses. Part II is an overview of the Dodd–Frank 
program. It provides an internal view of exactly what the Dodd–
Frank program is and how it will operate.  
Part III delves into various other bounty programs. Part III.A 
looks at the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) bounty program. 
Dodd–Frank was modeled after the IRS program.16 The experience 
with that program, therefore, enlightens what the expectations 
                                                                                                     
commits to regulatory efforts, a public regulatory system will always lack the 
one resource that is indispensable to effective detection and deterrence of 
complex economic wrongdoing: inside information.”).  
 12. See infra Part III (describing abuse and criticisms in multiple arenas).  
 13. See infra Part II (stating Dodd–Frank’s bounty as 10%–30% of the total 
recovered amount).  
 14. Cf. Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The 
Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protection for 
Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1202–03 (2010) (describing a survey 
and experiment on whistleblowers and stating “the level of monetary 
compensation offered through the regulatory system is decisive” and “high 
rewards were highly influential at the experimental stage”).  
 15. See infra Part III.B (describing abuses seen under the Federal False 
Claims Act).  
 16. See infra note 60 and accompanying text (reporting that the Dodd–
Frank provision is based on the IRS program).  
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under Dodd–Frank should be. Part III.B examines the Federal 
False Claims Act. This examination highlights several issues that 
are certain to arise under Dodd–Frank, including meritless 
reporting, nurturing unlawful conduct, and high transaction costs. 
Part III.C explores some state False Claims Acts and discovers 
some useful provisions applicable to the Dodd–Frank program. 
Part III.D discusses the Sarbanes–Oxley Act17 and its 
whistleblower-related provisions along with other state internal 
reporting requirements. Although Sarbanes–Oxley does not create 
a bounty program, the systems it establishes for internal reporting 
of wrongdoing are not only applicable but are absolutely vital to 
the proper functioning of the Dodd–Frank program. Finally, Part 
IV presents some recommendations that should be included in the 
Dodd–Frank program; these are needed to better ensure that all 
the “rogues” involved are properly policed and not just the rogues 
being chased.  
II. The Dodd–Frank Program 
On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–
Frank).18 Sections 922–24 of Title IX of Dodd–Frank implement a 
substantial whistleblower protection and bounty program.19 This 
Part details the contours of this new program and draws some 
comparisons to the former bounty program it replaces. 
Section 922 of Dodd–Frank amends the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)20 by adding section 21F.21 This new 
whistleblower bounty program only applies to “covered judicial or 
administrative actions,” defined as “any judicial or administrative 
                                                                                                     
 17. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(2002) (establishing increased disclosure and accounting requirements for 
publically held companies).  
 18. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protections Act, Pub. 
Law No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd–Frank].  
 19. Dodd–Frank § 922–24.   
 20. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15. U.S.C. 78a et seq. (2006) 
(establishing the Securities and Exchange Commission and providing for the 
regulation of secondary trading of securities and the regulation of financial 
markets and their participants).  
 21. See Dodd–Frank § 922(a).  
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action brought by the Commission under the securities laws that 
results in monetary sanctions exceeding $1,000,000.”22 The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission or SEC) 
defines “action” as “a single captioned judicial or administrative 
proceeding.”23  
This approach has two specific implications. First, “action” 
includes “all defendants or respondents, and all claims, that are 
brought within that proceeding without regard to which specific 
defendants or respondents, or which specific claims, were included 
in the action as a result of the information that the whistleblower 
provided.”24 This means if a whistleblower provided information 
about insider trading by a single individual, and the investigation 
leads to an action against multiple defendants, all “the sanctions 
collected from all the defendants in the action would be added up 
to determine whether the $1,000,000 threshold has been met.”25  
Second, “action” also means that the “Commission [will] not 
aggregate sanctions that are imposed in separate judicial or 
administrative actions for purposes of determining whether the 
$1,000,000 threshold is satisfied, even if the actions arise out of a 
single investigation.”26 Therefore, if a whistleblower provided 
information that lead to two separate judicial or administrative 
actions, one leading to a $500,000 sanction, and the other leading 
to an $800,000 sanction, these amounts would not be aggregated, 
and “no whistleblower award would be authorized because no 
single action will have obtained sanctions exceeding $1,000,000.”27  
                                                                                                     
 22. Id. § 922(a)(1).  
 23. Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of 
Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70521 
(proposed Nov. 17, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) [hereinafter 
SEC, Proposed Rules]; 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(d) (2011). At the time of writing, 
only the Proposed Rules were available. Some limited citations to, and 
comments regarding, the final rules have been made where necessary and 
appropriate. In the final rule, the definition of “action” also includes “two or 
more administrative or judicial proceedings brought by the Commission if these 
proceedings arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts.” 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.21F–4(d)(1) (2011).  
 24. SEC, Proposed Rules, supra note 23, at 70498.  
 25. Id. Although the final rule does not mention this analysis, given its 
adoption of the “same nucleus of operative facts” test, this analysis should 
remain correct.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. The final rule does give the Commission added discretion in this 
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Once the $1,000,000 threshold has been met, the 
whistleblower bounty program is triggered. In such an event, the 
Commission  
shall pay an award or awards to 1 or more whistleblowers who 
voluntarily provided original information to the Commission 
that led to the successful enforcement of the covered judicial or 
administrative action, or related action, in an aggregate amount 
equal to—  
(A) not less than 10 percent, in total, of what has been collected 
of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related 
actions; and  
(B) not more than 30 percent, in total, of what has been 
collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or 
related actions.28  
This portion of the legislation represents what is known as the 
“bounty” provision.29 There are several major points of departure 
here from the old SEC bounty program worth noting. The previous 
bounty provision under the Exchange Act called for “such sums, 
not to exceed 10 percent of such amounts, as the Commission 
deems appropriate.”30 First, this § 78u program left the payment of 
bounties totally at the discretion of the Commission, whereas the 
Dodd–Frank program directs that the Commission “shall” pay 
such awards.31 Second, the old provision capped all possible 
bounties at 10%, whereas the Dodd–Frank program imposes a 10% 
mandatory floor, with a possible reward up to a ceiling of 30%.32  
Another important difference from the § 78u program is a 
right of judicial review. Section 78u states, “Any determinations 
under this subsection, including whether, to whom, or in what 
                                                                                                     
regard, allowing aggregation where the proceedings arise out of the “same 
nucleus of operative facts.” However, the final rule still states that “[a]n action 
generally means a single captioned judicial or administrative proceeding.” 17 
C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(d) (2011).  
 28. Dodd–Frank § 922(b)(1).  
 29. See U.S. ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. General Elec. Co., 41 F.3d 
1032, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994) (discussing bounties in the False Claims Act and 
stating, “If . . . a sum of money is collected from the defendant as a result of the 
ensuing action or settlement, the relator is to receive a bounty between 15–25% 
of the collected sum (‘the bounty’).”).  
 30. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (2006).   
 31. Dodd–Frank § 922(b)(1). 
 32. Id.  
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amount to make payments, shall be in the sole discretion of the 
Commission . . . . Any such determination shall be final and not 
subject to judicial review.”33 Dodd–Frank, however, provides that, 
“Any such determination, except the determination of the amount of 
an award if the award was made in accordance with subsection (b), 
may be appealed to the appropriate court of appeals of the United 
States. . . .”34 Therefore, the only non-appealable determination 
under Dodd–Frank is a granted award that lies within the 10%–
30% range.35 However, determinations of “whether, [and] to whom,” 
to make an award, or awards outside of the 10%–30% range, are 
amenable to judicial review under Dodd–Frank.36  
The next important substantive change from the § 78u program 
is that the Dodd–Frank provision also applies to sanctions and 
settlements from “related action[s].”37 This is defined by the statute 
as meaning “any judicial or administrative action brought”38 by “the 
Attorney General of the United States, an appropriate regulatory 
authority, a self-regulatory organization, or a State attorney general 
in connection with any criminal investigation,”39 which is “based 
upon the [same] original information provided by [the] whistle-
blower”40 that initially led the Commission to obtain monetary 
sanctions totaling more than $1,000,000.41 The § 78u program only 
                                                                                                     
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (2006).  
 34. Dodd–Frank § 922(f).  
 35. Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 34347 (June 13, 2011) 
[hereinafter SEC, Final Rules] (“[W]hen the Commission makes an award 
between 10 and 30 percent . . . our final order regarding the amount of an award 
(including the award allocation among multiple whistleblowers) is not 
appealable.”).  
 36. Dodd–Frank § 922(f) (“Any determination made under this section, 
including whether, to whom, or in what amount to make awards, shall be in the 
discretion of the Commission. Any such determination . . . may be appealed to 
the appropriate court of appeals of the United States . . . .”).  
 37. Id. § 922(a)(5).  
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. § 922(h)(2)(D)(i)(I)–(IV). 
 40. Id. § 922(a)(5).  
 41. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–3(b)(1) (2011) (“A related action is a judicial or 
administrative action that is . . . based on the same original information that the 
whistleblower voluntarily provided to the Commission, and that led the 
Commission to obtain monetary sanctions totaling more than $1,000,000.”).  
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applied to sanctions recovered by “the Commission or the Attorney 
General.”42  
The next logical question is what are appropriate regulatory 
authorities or self-regulatory organizations? These have further 
been defined through the SEC rulemaking process.43 The SEC has 
defined an appropriate regulatory authority as “the Commission, 
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and any other 
agencies that may be defined as appropriate regulatory agencies 
under Section 3(a)(34) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 
78c(a)(34)).”44 Self-regulatory organizations include “any national 
securities exchange, registered securities association, registered 
clearing agency, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, and 
any other organizations that may be defined as self-regulatory 
organizations under Section 3(a)(26) of the Exchange Act (15 
U.S.C. 78c(a)(26)).”45 
Clearly, the “related action” provision of the Dodd–Frank 
program greatly expands the scope of this whistleblower bounty 
program. Once the initial $1,000,000 covered action hurdle is 
crossed, a putative whistleblower is eligible to receive 10%–30% of 
all sanctions recovered from any of the above listed entities.46 This 
provision highlights the major expansion that the Dodd–Frank 
whistleblower program is over its predecessor.  
Aside from the elements that expand upon the old § 78u 
program, other statutory language also requires parsing before the 
full scope of the new program becomes clear. First of all, Dodd–
Frank section 922(b)(1) states that the bounty will only be paid to 
                                                                                                     
 42. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (2006).  
 43. See generally SEC, Final Rules, supra note 35 (defining terms 
associated with the Dodd–Frank whistleblower program); SEC, Proposed Rules, 
supra note 23 (same). 
 44. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(f) (2011).  
 45. Id. § 240.21F–4(h).  
 46. See id. § 240.21F–3(b) (“The Commission will also pay an award based 
on amounts collected in certain related actions . . . A related action is a judicial 
or administrative action that is . . . based on the same original 
information . . . that led the Commission to obtain monetary sanctions totaling 
more than $1,000,000.”).   
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a “whistleblower.”47 But what is a whistleblower? The Commission 
states:  
You are a whistleblower if, alone or jointly with others, you 
provide the Commission with information . . . and the 
information relates to a possible violation of the Federal 
securities laws . . . that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to 
occur. A whistleblower must be an individual. A company or 
another entity is not eligible to be a whistleblower.48 
Next, section 922(b)(1) states that the whistleblower must 
have “voluntarily provided original information.”49 The 
Commission has defined these two terms in a very restrictive way. 
The Commission will deem a submission to be “voluntary” if the 
whistleblower “provide[s] the Commission with the information 
before [the whistleblower] or anyone representing [the 
whistleblower] (such as an attorney) receives any request, inquiry, 
or demand . . . about a matter to which the information in [the] 
submission is relevant.”50 The Commission also states that a 
submission will not be considered voluntary if the whistleblower is 
“under a pre-existing legal or contractual duty to report the 
securities violations that are the subject” of the submission.51  
“Original Information” is even more restrictively defined. The 
statute states:  
The term “original information” means information that—  
(A) is derived from the independent knowledge or analysis of a 
whistleblower;  
(B) is not known to the Commission from any other source, 
unless the whistleblower is the original source of the 
information; and  
(C) is not exclusively derived from an allegation made in a 
judicial or administrative hearing, in a governmental report, 
                                                                                                     
 47. Dodd–Frank § 922(b)(1).  
 48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–2(a)(1) (2011).  
 49. Dodd–Frank § 922(b)(1).  
 50. SEC, Proposed Rules, supra note 23, at 70520. The final rule’s language 
on this point remained almost unchanged from the proposed rules. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.21F–4(a) (2011).  
 51. SEC, Proposed Rules, supra note 23, at 70520. This language also was 
nearly unchanged. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(a)(3) (2011).  
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hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless 
the whistleblower is a source of the information.52  
The Commission goes even further by additionally refining what 
“independent knowledge or analysis” entails. The Commission will 
not consider information to be derived from the whistleblower’s 
individual knowledge or analysis:  
(i) If you obtained the information through a communication that 
was subject to the attorney-client privilege. . . . 
(ii) If you obtained the information in connection with the legal 
representation of a client on whose behalf you or your employer or 
firm are providing services, and you seek to use the information to 
make a whistleblower submission for your own benefit. . . .  
(iii) In circumstances not covered by paragraphs [](i) or [](ii) of this 
section, if you obtained the information because you were:  
(A) An officer, director, trustee, or partner of an entity and 
another person informed you of allegations of misconduct, 
or you learned the information in connection with the 
entity’s processes for identifying, reporting, and addressing 
possible violations of law;  
(B) An employee whose principal duties involve compliance 
or internal audit responsibilities, or you were employed by 
or otherwise associated with a firm retained to perform 
compliance or internal audit functions for an entity;  
(C) Employed by or otherwise associated with a firm 
retained to conduct an inquiry or investigation into possible 
violations of law; or  
(D) An employee of, or other person associated with, a 
public accounting firm, if you obtained the information 
through the performance of an engagement required of an 
independent public accountant under the Federal securities 
laws . . . . 
(iv) If you obtained the information by a means or in a manner that 
is determined by a United States court to violate applicable 
Federal or state criminal law . . . . 
(vi) If you obtained the information from a person who is subject to 
this section . . . .53  
                                                                                                     
 52. Dodd–Frank § 922(a)(3).  
 53. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(b)(4) (2011). There are some limited exceptions 
to the exclusions in (iii). See generally id. § 240.21F–4(b)(4)(v).   
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This restrictive definition of “independent knowledge” and by 
proxy “original information” will likely serve to reduce the number 
of successful whistleblower bounty claims by limiting the number 
of eligible participants.54  
The final requirement of section 922(b)(1) is that the 
information must have “led to the successful enforcement” of the 
covered action.55 The Commission will consider original 
information to have “led to” a successful enforcement if the 
whistleblower’s submission “was sufficiently specific, credible, and 
timely to cause the staff to commence an examination, open an 
investigation, reopen an investigation that the Commission had 
closed, or to inquire concerning different conduct as part of a 
current examination or investigation, and the Commission brought 
a successful judicial or administrative action based in whole or in 
part on conduct that was the subject of your original 
information.”56  
The Commission will also consider the whistleblower’s 
submission to have passed the “led to” requirement if the 
whistleblower “gave the Commission original information about 
conduct that was already under examination or 
investigation . . . and [the information] significantly contributed to 
the success of the action.”57 The Commission has implied that it 
intends to interpret this second prong strictly, so that bounty 
rewards under it will be rare.58  
III. Other Whistleblower Bounty Programs 
To determine the likely effects of the Dodd–Frank program, it 
is relevant to look at other whistleblower bounty programs and 
                                                                                                     
 54. See SEC, Proposed Rules, supra note 23, at 70516 (“[T]he restrictions in 
this definition would limit the pool of eligible whistleblowers and thereby reduce 
the number of potentially useful informants . . . .”).  
 55. Dodd–Frank § 922(b)(1).  
 56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(c)(1) (2011).  
 57. Id. § 240.21F–4(c)(2).  
 58. See SEC, Final Rules, supra note 35, at 34325 (“In applying this 
standard, among other things, we will look at factors such as whether the 
information allowed us to bring: (1) Our successful action in significantly less 
time or with significantly fewer resources; (2) additional successful claims; or 
(3) successful claims against additional individuals or entities.”).  
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perform a comparative analysis. From these we can determine 
likely bounty amounts, determine the likely level of reporting, and 
identify relevant changes that should be implemented into the 
Dodd–Frank program. Several similar bounty programs exist both 
on the federal and state levels.59 From this analysis we can 
ascertain important implementation and administrative policies 
that should be incorporated into the Dodd–Frank program.  
A. The IRS Bounty Program 
The most appropriate starting point for this comparative 
analysis is the program upon which the Dodd–Frank program is 
based, the Internal Revenue Service’s bounty program.60 The IRS 
program was established pursuant to the Tax Relief and 
Healthcare Act of 2006.61 Similar to Dodd–Frank and the old § 78u 
program for the SEC, the IRS program was established to 
strengthen a bounty program that had been in place since 1867,62 
but was mostly ineffective.63 The new program was established by 
adding subsection (b) to the 140-year-old § 7623 of the Internal 
Revenue Code.64 Section 7623(a), similar to the § 78u program, 
                                                                                                     
 59. See generally M. Thomas Arnold, “It’s Déjà Vu All Over Again” Using 
Bounty Hunters to Leverage Gatekeeper Duties, 45 TULSA L. REV. 419 (2010); 
Pamela Bucy et al., States, Statutes, and Fraud: A Study of Emerging State 
Efforts to Combat White Collar Crime, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523 (2010) 
[hereinafter Bucy, States]. 
 60. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 111 (2010) (“The [Dodd–Frank] program is 
modeled after a successful IRS Whistleblower Program enacted into law in 
2006.”).  
 61. See Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922, 2958 (2006) (codified at 26 
U.S.C. § 7623(b)) (establishing an expanded IRS whistleblower bounty 
program).  
 62. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 7, 14 Stat. 471, 473 (codified at I.R.C. 
§ 7623(a)) (providing the commissioner of the IRS with the power to “pay such 
sums” as he deems “necessary for detecting and bringing to trial and 
punishment” those who violate the internal revenue laws).  
 63. See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX 
LAW. 357, 364 (2008) (concluding that the old IRS Informant Reward Program 
failed due to “paltry bounties, stingy administrators, inadequate protection for 
whistleblowers, and unreceptive courts”).  
 64. See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, Div. 
A, Title IV, § 406(d), 120 Stat. 2922 (2006) (amending 26 U.S.C. § 7623 by 
adding new subsection 7623(b)).  
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leaves reward amounts to the total discretion of the 
Commissioner.65 The § 7623(a) program is still in effect today for 
those whistleblower claims that do not qualify for subsection (b) 
treatment.66  
The Dodd–Frank program is extremely similar to the IRS 
§ 7623(b) program.67 Section 7623(b)(1) provides that 
whistleblowers shall receive a 15%–30% bounty of the collected 
revenues if the Secretary of the IRS proceeds with any 
administrative or judicial action based on the information brought 
to the Secretary’s attention by the whistleblower.68 Such 
information must relate to either the underpayment of taxes or the 
bringing to justice of those who have violated the tax laws.69 The 
§ 7623(b) program is limited, however. It applies to both 
                                                                                                     
 65. See I.R.C. § 7623(a) (2006) (“The Secretary, under regulations 
prescribed by the Secretary, is authorized to pay such sums as he deems 
necessary for—(1) detecting underpayments of tax . . . .”); see also John R. 
Dorocak, State Tax Informants: Rewards and Liabilities Implementation in 
California and Guidance From the New and Old Federal Program—Should 
They be Paid?, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 279, 282–84 (2008) (stating that the §7623(b) 
program takes away IRS discretion “through the ‘shall receive’ language” but 
that the §7623(a) arm of the program “leaves the amount of the reward to the 
discretion” of the IRS).  
 66. See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(5) (2006) (“This subsection shall apply with respect 
to any action—(A) against any taxpayer, but in the case of any individual, only if 
such individual’s gross income exceeds $200,000 . . . and (B) if the tax, penalties, 
interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts in dispute exceed 
$2,000,000.”); see also Dorocak, supra note 65, at 282 (“Section 7623(b)(5) 
indicates that 7623(b) does not apply . . . unless such individual’s gross income 
in any involved year exceeds $200,000 and the amounts in dispute exceed $2 
million. . . . Thus, many IRS informants . . . will continue to suffer the problems 
of the existing IRS reward [§7623(a)] program.”).  
 67. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 112 (2010) (using the IRS’s program as a 
model, the Senate Banking Committee “determined that enforceability and 
relatively predictable level of payout will go a long way to motivate potential 
whistleblowers to come forward”).  
 68. See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2006) (“If the Secretary proceeds with any 
administrative or judicial action . . . based on information brought to the 
Secretary’s attention by an individual, such individual shall, subject to 
paragraph (2), receive as an award at least 15 percent but not more than 30 
percent of the collected proceeds . . . .”).  
 69. See id. § 7623(a) (“The Secretary, under regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary, is authorized to pay such sums as he deems necessary for—(1) 
detecting underpayments of tax, or (2) detecting and bringing to trial and 
punishment persons guilty of violating the internal revenue laws or conniving at 
the same. . . .”); Id. § 7623(b)(1) (“If the Secretary proceeds with any 
administrative or judicial action described in subsection (a) . . . .”).  
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corporations and individuals, but in the case of an action against 
an individual, such individual’s gross income must exceed 
$200,000 for one of the taxable years in dispute.70 Also, for the 
program to trigger in any case, the amount in dispute must exceed 
$2 million.71 If these requirements are not met the whistleblower 
may revert to the § 7623(a) program.72  
Whistleblowers who file under § 7623(b) also have a right to 
judicial review by the Tax Court of their claims and awards under 
this program.73 The appeal, however, must occur within thirty 
days of the award determination.74  
Because the two programs are so similar, the success of the 
§ 7623(b) program is particularly relevant to any inquiry into the 
likely effect of the Dodd–Frank program. Since the § 7623(b) 
program’s passage in 2006, the IRS has seen a marked increase in 
reporting: from 2,751 cases received in Fiscal Year (FY) 2007, to 
5,678 cases received in FY 2009, an over 100% increase in 
reporting over just three years.75 From FY 2007 through FY 2009, 
$41,822,569 in whistleblower awards were paid,76 and 
                                                                                                     
 70. See id. § 7623(b)(5) (“This subsection shall apply with respect to any 
action—(A) against any taxpayer, but in the case of any individual, only if such 
individual’s gross income exceeds $200,000 for any taxable year subject to such 
action . . . .”).  
 71. See id. (“This subsection shall apply with respect to any action . . . if the 
tax, penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts in dispute 
exceed $2,000,000.”).  
 72. See Michelle M. Kwon, Whistling Dixie About the IRS Whistleblower 
Program Thanks to the IRC Confidentiality Restrictions, 29 VA. TAX REV. 447, 
456 (2010) (“The Service whistleblower law as it was before the 2006 
amendments continues to exist in section 7623(a). Section 7623(a) applies to 
claims that do not meet the section 7623(b) thresholds and to information 
submitted before the new law became effective.” (internal citations omitted)).  
 73. See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(4) (2006) (“Any determination regarding an award 
under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) may, within 30 days of such determination, be 
appealed to the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with 
respect to such matter).”).  
 74. Id.  
 75. IRS, FY 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE USE OF SECTION 7623 
7–8 (2010) [hereinafter IRS, 2009 REPORT], available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/whistleblowerfy09rtc.pdf. This report discusses program activities for the 
fiscal year 2009, which ended September 30, 2009. Id. at 1. It represents the 
most current information available at the time of this writing.  
 76. Id. at 8.  
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$543,802,993 of unpaid taxes were collected.77 The Treasury 
Inspector General for Tax Administration found that in 2008 
whistleblower reports alleged $65 billion in underreported 
income,78 up from alleged underreporting of $8 billion in 2007, an 
increase by a factor of eight.79 It is also worth noting that from 
2003 through 2006, there were zero IRS collections of over $2 
million through the whistleblower program.80 But in 2007, the first 
full year in which the new § 7623(b) program was in effect, there 
were twelve collections of over $2 million,81 and there were a total 
of thirteen collections over $2 million in 2008 and 2009.82  
This data reveals that the § 7623(b) program has led to 
increased reporting. However, no awards have been paid out under 
it yet due to an IRS policy of waiting until the period for filing an 
appeal has lapsed before paying any awards.83 Therefore, the 
§ 7623(b) program has not affected the total percentage dollar 
amount of the bounties that have been paid to date.84 
                                                                                                     
 77. Id. 
 78. TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, DEFICIENCIES 
EXIST IN THE CONTROL AND TIMELY RESOLUTION OF WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIMS 1 
(2009), available at www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2009reports/00930114 
fr.pdf. 
 79. Id. at 6.  
 80. See IRS, FY 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE USE OF SECTION 
7623 6 (2008), available at www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/whistleblower_ 
annual_report.pdf (reporting whistleblower data from fiscal year 2003 through 
2007).  
 81. Id. 
 82. IRS, 2009 REPORT, supra note 75, at 9.  
 83. See id. at 7 (“[T]he Whistleblower Office determined that in cases 
where the taxpayer has not filed an appeal, the IRS should not pay the claim 
until the period for filing an appeal has lapsed. . . . [U]ntil two years have 
passed after the last payment, the case is still subject to . . . appeal.”). 
 84. See id. (“To date, all awards the IRS has paid have been based on 
information received before December 20, 2006, the date of the enactment of 
section [7623(b)]. Therefore, all of the awards, including those paid in FY 2009, 
were governed by . . . what is now section 7623(a).”). The report goes on to state, 
“Thus, the applicable award percentages were those established in prior IRS 
policy, not the higher percentages set by the new law.” Id. The most infamous 
reporting under the new § 7623(b) program is that of Bradley Birkenfeld, a 
former employee of UBS, Switzerland’s largest bank. See Janet Novak & 
William P. Barrett, Tax Informants Are On the Loose, FORBES, Dec. 14, 2009, at 
104 (reporting the story of Birkenfeld’s whistleblowing). His information about 
tax evasion techniques led to a $780 million dollar payment by UBS to the U.S. 
government, but also resulted in forty months of jail time for Birkenfeld. See 
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Despite the possible pitfalls and slow payments, the § 7623(b) 
program has led to increased reporting and will eventually lead to 
increased bounty payments. Given the similarity of the § 7623(b) 
and Dodd–Frank programs, a similar marked increase in reporting 
and payments should be expected under Dodd–Frank.85  
B. The Federal False Claims Act86  
The IRS program, and therefore implicitly the Dodd–Frank 
program, is in many ways modeled after the False Claims Act 
(FCA).87 The FCA is an example of a “qui tam” provision, a Latin 
term short for, “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac 
parte sequitur,” which translates to “who as well for the king as for 
himself sues in this matter.”88 In a qui tam action, private citizens 
(known as “relators”89) with personal knowledge of wrongdoing 
(here, fraud perpetrated against the government) can bring a suit 
on behalf of the United States, and in return he or she gets to 
share in a significant “cut of the judgment proceeds should they 
prevail.”90 Qui tam provisions were quite popular in England at 
                                                                                                     
David S. Hilzenrath, A Swiss Banker’s Saga Offers a Cautionary Tale: For 
Spilling Secrets to the Government, You Could be Richly Rewarded or Sent to 
Prison. Or Both., WASH. POST, May 16, 2010, at G1 (reporting on Birkenfeld’s 
criminal case and imprisonment).  
 85. See Yin Wilczek, SEC to Take Advantage of New Powers to File Aiding, 
Abetting Charges, Official Says, 8 CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY REP. (BNA) 1224 (Nov. 
12, 2010) (quoting David Rosenfeld, associate director of the SEC’s New York 
Regional Office as stating that his office has been “inundated” with tips under 
the Dodd–Frank program, and that he “expect[s] tons of these whistleblower 
complaints”).  
 86. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006) (establishing a private right to bring 
“a civil action” on behalf of “the person and for the United States Government” 
against parties who make fraudulent claims for payment by the government).   
 87. See Kwon, supra note 72, at 457 (“The 2006 amendments to the IRS 
Whistleblower Act in many respects model the 1986 amendments to the federal 
False Claims Act.”).  
 88. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1368 (9th ed. 2009).  
 89. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 5C (2010) (“An individual, hereafter 
referred to as relator, may bring a civil action in superior court for a violation of 
said sections . . . on behalf of the relator and the commonwealth or any political 
subdivision thereof.”).  
 90. U.S. ex rel. Lamers v. Green Bay, 998 F. Supp. 971, 977 (E.D. Wis. 
1998), aff’d, 168 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 1999).  
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the time of our nation’s founding, and early American Congresses 
likewise enacted multiple qui tam statutes.91 Most of these 
provisions, however, no longer exist.92  
The FCA was originally passed in 1863 in response to fraud 
perpetrated on the government during the Civil War.93 It was 
commonly referred to as the “Lincoln Law,” and it responded to 
reports that, amongst other frauds, the U.S. government was being 
sold the same horses multiple times or supplies that were nothing 
but boxes of sawdust.94 The essence of a FCA claim is that the 
defendant has “knowingly” presented or caused to be presented a 
false or fraudulent claim for payment.95  
The FCA remained relatively dormant after the Civil War 
until the 1930s and 1940s when increased government spending on 
New Deal programs and the build up to World War II “opened up 
numerous opportunities for unscrupulous government contractors 
to defraud the government.”96 Unfortunately, the large cash 
                                                                                                     
 91. See J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication 
of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 553 (2002) (“Qui tam enforcement 
has never been as widespread in this country as it once was in England. Early 
American Congresses continued the English practice by enacting a few qui tam 
statutes.”); Id. at 553 n.54 (noting early American qui tam statutes relating to 
the collection of duties, regulation of the slave trade, and the employment of 
seamen without a contract, amongst others).  
 92. See id. at 554 (“Most of these passed out of existence long ago, and only 
a smattering of qui tam provisions still linger in the United States Code.”).  
 93. See STEPHEN M. KOHN, CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES IN WHISTLEBLOWER 
LAW 203 (2001) (“The False Claims Act . . . is the major law utilized to ‘feret out 
fraud against the federal government.’ It was enacted during the Civil War at 
the ‘behest’ of President Abraham Lincoln to ‘control fraud in defense 
contracts’ . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).  
 94. See Todd J. Canni, Who’s Making False Claims, The Qui Tam Plaintiff 
or the Government Contractor? A Proposal to Amend the FCA to Require that All 
Qui Tam Plaintiffs Possess Direct Knowledge, 37 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 4 (2007) 
(“[T]he FCA was commonly referred to as ‘the Lincoln Law’ because President 
Abraham Lincoln advocated in favor of its passage. . . [S]ome war profiteers had 
engaged in . . . shipping boxes of sawdust in place of supplies or by tricking the 
Government into purchasing the same horses more than once.” (internal 
citations omitted)).  
 95. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2006). “Knowingly” is further defined as, 
“[H]as actual knowledge of the information; (ii) acts in deliberate ignorance of 
the truth or falsity of the information; or (iii) acts in reckless disregard of the 
truth or falsity of the information; and (B) require no proof of specific intent to 
defraud.” Id. § 3729(b)(1)(A), (B).  
 96. U.S. ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boran Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 679 
(D.C. Cir. 1997).   
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bounties offered by the FCA also provided great incentive for 
relators to file “parasitic” suits, actions not based on any personal 
knowledge of the relator, but rather consisting solely of 
information already known to the government.97 The relator 
simply needed to file the action before the government could.98  
This abuse led to reform in 1943, when Congress amended the 
FCA to deprive courts of jurisdiction when the suit was based on 
evidence or information already “in the possession of the United 
States, or any agency.”99 The change, however, lead to absurd 
results; in one case the state of Wisconsin was unable to pursue a 
doctor who had submitted 912 fraudulent claims for 
reimbursement from Medicare because, as required by statute, the 
State had already disclosed the fraud to the federal government 
before filing the suit.100 To make matters worse, the Attorney 
General failed to intervene, “leaving no proper plaintiff to pursue 
patently fraudulent conduct.”101 Due to this “government 
knowledge bar,” the number of qui tam claims brought under the 
FCA decreased significantly.102 
                                                                                                     
 97. See Beverly Cohen, Trouble at the Source: The Debates Over the Public 
Disclosure Provisions of the False Claims Act’s Original Source Rule, 60 MERCER 
L. REV. 701, 704 (2009) (“[T]he Act did not require the relators to allege 
undiscovered frauds in their qui tam complaints; instead, relators were able to 
commence a qui tam lawsuit based completely on information already uncovered 
by government investigators. [The Act was] [w]ithout any statutory restrictions 
on these ‘parasitic’ lawsuits . . . .” (citations omitted)).  
 98. See KOHN, supra note 93, at 205 (“In fact, the language of the law 
permitted ‘piggy-back law suits’ in which the relator could merely copy a 
criminal fraud indictment and rush to the courthouse to beat the government in 
filing the FCA claim.”). 
 99. Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608, 609 (1943).  
 100. See U.S. ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1102, 1104 (7th Cir. 
1984) (finding that the State could not pursue the claim because the information 
had already been revealed to the federal government).  
 101. U.S. ex rel. Lamers v. Green Bay, 998 F. Supp. 971, 977 (E.D. Wis. 
1998), aff’d, 168 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 1999).  
 102. See U.S. ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 
680 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“The use of qui tam suits as a weapon for fighting fraud 
against the government dramatically declined.”); Cohen, supra note 97, at 706 
(“[T]he ‘government knowledge’ standard ultimately frustrated the efforts of 
legitimate relators who had acquired knowledge of the fraud on their own but 
were required by law to report the fraud. As a result, use of qui tam lawsuits 
declined.” (internal citations omitted)).   
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With this checkered past in mind, Congress amended the FCA 
in 1986 to its current version.103 The 1986 amendments repealed 
the government knowledge bar, and courts are only deprived of 
jurisdiction if the complaint is based upon allegations or 
transactions that were publically disclosed, unless the relator was 
the source of the public disclosure.104 Public disclosures include: 
federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearings in which the 
government is a party; congressional reports, audits, and 
investigations; and disclosures “from the news media.”105 To avoid 
this “public disclosure bar,” the relator must show that he is an 
“original source,” defined as an individual who prior to the public 
disclosure “voluntarily disclosed to the Government the 
information on which allegations or transactions in a claim are 
based,” or “who has knowledge that is independent of and 
materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or 
transactions, and who has voluntarily provided the information to 
the Government before filing [the qui tam complaint].”106 Most 
commentators state that the relator must have “direct and 
independent knowledge” of the allegations on which the claim is 
based.107 
We see this history, and the incremental changes to the FCA 
to remedy it, reflected in Dodd–Frank’s definition of “original 
information.”108 Dodd–Frank and the Commission’s rules define 
“original information” to exclude information that was “exclusively 
derived” from a judicial or administrative hearing, in a 
governmental report, or from “the news media,”109 unless “the 
                                                                                                     
 103. See False Claims Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986) 
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006)) (amending the False 
Claims Act).  
 104. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2006) (“The court shall dismiss an action or 
claim under this section . . . if substantially the same allegations or transactions 
as alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed . . . unless . . . the person 
bringing the action is an original source of the information.”). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).  
 107. See, e.g., KOHN, supra note 93, at 208 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B)); 
Cohen, supra note 97, at 709.  
 108. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (quoting the full definition of 
“original information”).  
 109. Dodd–Frank § 922(a)(3)(C); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(b) (2011).  
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whistleblower is a source of the information.”110 This is nearly a 
direct parroting of the FCA’s “public disclosure bar” discussed 
above111 and illustrates Dodd–Frank’s parallels to and awareness 
of issues faced by the FCA in the past. 
Although private citizens bring these qui tam FCA claims, a 
claim must be filed “in the name of the [United States] 
Government.”112 A copy of the complaint along with a “disclosure of 
substantially all material evidence” must then be served on the 
government.113 The complaint is filed in camera and under seal for 
sixty days.114 The complaint is not served on the defendant “until 
the court so orders.”115 During those sixty days, the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) “may elect” to intervene in the suit.116 However, the 
DOJ may “for good cause” move for an extension of the sixty-day 
intervention period, and this may be done an indefinite number of 
times.117 Most importantly, even if the DOJ decides not to 
intervene, the relator can still go forward with the suit.118 
If the DOJ does intervene, its primacy is indisputable.119 In 
fact, the DOJ can dismiss the case over the objection of the 
relator.120 This power, however, is rarely used.121 Further, the 
                                                                                                     
 110. Dodd–Frank § 922(a)(3)(B).  
 111. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text (discussing the FCA’s 
“public disclosure bar”).  
 112. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2006).  
 113. Id. § 3730(b)(2).  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. § 3730(b)(3); Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem 
with Privatization of Public Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 287 (2007) (“The Government may request an 
indefinite number of continuances while it considers and reviews the case at 
issue.”).  
 118. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (2006) (“Before the expiration of the 60-day 
period . . . the Government shall—(A) proceed with the action . . . or (B) notify 
the court that it declines to take over the action, in which case the person 
bringing the action shall have the right to conduct the action.”).  
 119. See id. § 3730(c)(1) (“If the Government proceeds with the action, it 
shall have the primary responsibility for prosecuting the action, and shall not be 
bound by an act of the person bringing the action.”).  
 120. See id. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (“The Government may dismiss the action 
notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action.”). 
 121. See Michael Rich, Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Encouraging the 
Department of Justice to Rein In Out-of-Control Qui Tam Litigation Under the 
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Attorney General may also settle the claim over the objection of 
the relator if the settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable.”122 
A relator’s participation in the case can also be greatly restricted if 
the DOJ shows that the relator’s involvement would “interfere 
with or unduly delay the Government’s prosecution of the case.”123 
Even where the DOJ decides not to intervene, the FCA gives the 
DOJ substantial supervisory powers such as the right to be served 
with all pleadings, transcripts of all depositions,124 and the ability 
to stay discovery.125 The DOJ can also preempt the relator’s claim 
by pursuing it through alternative means.126 Finally, upon a 
                                                                                                     
Civil False Claims Act, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2008) (“However, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) exercises its check only occasionally, intervening 
in less than a quarter of the qui tam actions filed and moving to dismiss 
sparingly.”). 
 122. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B) (2006) (“The Government may settle the 
action with the defendant notwithstanding the objections of the person 
initiating the action if the court determines, after a hearing, that the proposed 
settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances.”).  
 123. See id. § 3730(c)(2)(C), (D) (stating certain limitations that may be 
imposed). The statute states:  
Upon a showing by the Government that unrestricted participation 
during the course of the litigation by the person initiating the action 
would interfere with or unduly delay the Government’s prosecution of 
the case, or would be repetitious, irrelevant, or for purposes of 
harassment, the court may, in its discretion, impose limitations on 
the person’s participation, such as– 
(i) limiting the number of witnesses the person may call;  
(ii) limiting the length of the testimony of such witnesses;  
(iii) limiting the person’s cross-examination of witnesses; or  
(iv) otherwise limiting the participation by the person in the 
litigation.  
(D) Upon a showing by the defendant that unrestricted participation 
during the course of the litigation by the person initiating the action 
would be for purposes of harassment or would cause the defendant 
undue burden or unnecessary expense, the court may limit the 
participation by the person in the litigation.  
Id.  
 124. See id. § 3730(c)(3) (“If the Government so requests, it shall be served 
with copies of all pleadings filed in the action and shall be supplied with copies 
of all deposition transcripts (at the Government’s expense).”).  
 125. See id. § 3730(c)(4) (“[U]pon a showing by the Government . . . the court 
may stay such discovery for a period of not more than 60 days.”).   
 126. See id. § 3730(c)(5) (“Notwithstanding subsection (b), the Government 
may elect to pursue its claim through any alternate remedy available to the 
Government, including any administrative proceeding to determine a civil 
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showing of good cause, the DOJ may choose to intervene at a later 
date.127  
The 1986 FCA amendments also increased the penalties under 
the Act to between $5,500–$11,000 per false claim, plus three 
times the amount of damages sustained by the government due to 
the defendant’s fraudulent act.128 The FCA defines “claim” as “any 
request or demand . . . for money or property.”129 This means, for 
example, that each false request for payment submitted by a 
doctor will be considered a separate claim, amenable to separate 
$5,500–$11,000 penalties.130 Then, any monetary damages 
resulting from the fraudulent claims that are inflicted on the 
government are trebled.131 Therefore, potential recoveries, 
especially in the medical arena, can quickly escalate into the “tens 
or hundreds of millions of dollars.”132  
Assuming that the public disclosure bar and all other hurdles 
are passed, the relator then takes his or her share of the 
                                                                                                     
money penalty.”).  
 127. See id. § 3730(c)(3) (“When a person proceeds with the action, the court, 
without limiting the status and rights of the person initiating the action, may 
nevertheless permit the Government to intervene at a later date upon a showing 
of good cause.”).  
 128. See id. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (“[A] civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not 
more than $10,000 . . . plus 3 times the amount of damages which the 
Government sustains because of the act of that person.”); 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(9) 
(2012) (raising the mandatory FCA penalty “minimum from $5,000 to $5,500; 
maximum from $10,000 to $11,000”).  
 129. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2)(A) (2006).  
 130. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5266, 5274 (“Each separate bill, voucher or other ‘false payment demand’ 
constitutes a separate claim for which a forfeiture shall be imposed, . . . and this 
is true although many such claims may be submitted to the Government at one 
time.” (internal citations omitted)). The report continues, “For example, a doctor 
who completes separate Medicare claims for each patient treated will be liable 
for a forfeiture for each such form that contains false entries even though 
several such forms may be submitted to the fiscal intermediary at one time.” Id. 
 131. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2006) (“[A] civil penalty of not less than 
$5,000 and not more than $10,000 . . . plus 3 times the amount of damages 
which the Government sustains because of the act of that person.”).  
 132. Rich, supra note 121, at 1248; see also U.S. ex rel. Tyson v. Amerigroup 
Ill., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d. 719, 740–42 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (assessing separate FCA 
penalties for each false enrollment form completed by defendant for each of 
18,130 patients, even though the intermediary submitted only twenty-four 
claims to the government resulting from the forms, for a total FCA penalty of 
nearly $100 million). 
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damages.133 The relator is entitled to not less than 15% and not 
more than 25% of the proceeds from any settlement or judgment in 
which the DOJ intervenes.134 Where the DOJ fails to intervene, the 
relator is entitled to “not less than 25[%] and not more than 30[%] 
of the proceeds of the action or settlement.”135 In either event, the 
relator is also entitled to recover “an amount for reasonable 
expenses which the court finds to have been necessarily incurred, 
plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.”136  
There are some compensation limitations in the statute as 
well. If the court finds that the relator “planned and initiated” the 
violation on which the action is brought, the court may “to the 
extent [it] considers appropriate” reduce the relator’s share below 
the 15% or 25% minimums.137 Further, if the relator is convicted of 
criminal conduct arising from the underlying violation, the relator 
is dismissed from the case and is entitled to receive no 
compensation.138  
Finally, the FCA also has one seemingly strong provision that 
should disincentivize meritless suits: if the relator’s claim is not 
                                                                                                     
 133. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text (describing the public 
disclosure bar).  
 134. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2006) (“If the Government proceeds with an 
action brought by a person under subsection (b), such person shall . . . receive at 
least 15[%] but not more than 25[%] of the proceeds of the action or settlement 
of the claim . . . .”). The award can be reduced below the 15% minimum in 
certain public disclosure situations. Id. The statute states: 
Where the action is one which the court finds to be based primarily on 
disclosures of specific information (other than information provided 
by the person bringing the action) relating to allegations or 
transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a 
congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office 
report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, the 
court may award such sums as it considers appropriate, but in no 
case more than 10 percent of the proceeds, taking into account the 
significance of the information and the role of the person bringing the 
action in advancing the case to litigation.  
Id. 
 135. Id. § 3730(d)(2).  
 136. Id. § 3730(d)(1), (d)(2).  
 137. Id. § 3730(d)(3).  
 138. See. id. (“If the person bringing the action is convicted of criminal 
conduct arising from his or her role in the violation of section 3729, that person 
shall be dismissed from the civil action and shall not receive any share of the 
proceeds of the action.”). 
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joined by the DOJ and the defendant is successful in defending 
against the suit, the court “may award to the defendant its 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses” if it finds that the suit 
was “clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for 
purposes of harassment.”139 Despite this clear indication from 
Congress, reverse-attorney’s fees awards are rarely granted under 
this provision.140 
From one point of view, the FCA, with its qui tam element, 
has been a resounding success.141 Since 1987, the year after its 
reinvigoration, claims under the FCA have resulted in the recovery 
of over $27 billion.142 Over that period, the relators’ share of the 
recoveries has been nearly $3 billion.143  
Recent examples of the FCA’s efficacy include the story of 
Cheryl Eckard.144 She blew the whistle on GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) 
over faulty drug manufacturing in the company’s Puerto Rico 
                                                                                                     
 139. Id. § 3730(d)(4); see also S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 29 (1986) reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5294 (“The Committee added this language in order to 
create a strong disincentive and send a clear message to those who might 
consider using the private enforcement provision of this Act for illegitimate 
purposes.”). The report continues, “The Committee encourages courts to strictly 
apply this provision in frivolous or harassment suits as well as any applicable 
sanctions available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id.  
 140. See, e.g., Pfingston v. Ronan  Eng’g Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1006–07 (9th Cir. 
2002) (“The award of fees under the False Claims Act is reserved for rare and 
special circumstances.”).   
 141. See Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 11, at 58 (“The qui tam private 
justice model, by comparison, has proven to be highly effective in recruiting 
legal talent . . . . Because of the large recoveries available to private plaintiffs 
under the FCA[,] . . . plaintiffs’ counsel can receive large fees . . . .” (citation 
omitted)). The article continues, “These large fees are a significant incentive for 
top legal talent to undertake qui tam plaintiffs’ work.” Id. In addition, “the qui 
tam FCA ‘common good’ private justice action is extremely successful in 
bringing forth helpful inside information.” Id. at 61.  
 142. See CIVIL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS—OVERVIEW 2 
(Nov. 23, 2010) [hereinafter FRAUD STATISTICS, 2010], available at 
www.taf.org/FCA-stats-2010.pdf (reporting $27,195,570,308 in total settlements 
and judgments for both qui tam and non-qui tam actions under the FCA).  
 143. See id. (reporting $2,877,694,871 as the relator share of awards).  
 144. See Lisa Flam, Ex-Worker Wins $96M for Blowing Whistle on Drug 
Giant, AOLNEWS.COM (Oct. 27, 2010, 12:50 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/ 
10/27/ex-worker-wins-96m-for-blowing-whistle-on-drug-giant/ (last visited Apr. 
10, 2012) (reporting on a recent whistleblower who reported under the False 
Claims Act against GlaxoSmithKine) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).   
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plant.145 The claim resulted in a $750 million penalty against GSK 
and a $96 million award for Eckard, believed to be the single-
biggest whistleblower bounty ever in the United States.146 Further, 
is the story of John Kophinski, a former sales representative for 
Pfizer, whose reporting lead to a $50 million dollar bounty for 
himself and $2.3 billion in payments by Pfizer for illegal drug 
marketing.147 
Despite these examples of the extreme good that can come 
from FCA qui tam litigation, the academic and statistical record is 
replete with examples of its utter misuse through expanded 
liability, meritless claims, and increased transaction costs.148  
1. Non-Meritorious Claims 
The key issue here, as it relates to Dodd–Frank, is the amount 
of non-meritorious claims filed by qui tam plaintiffs under the 
FCA, as this will likely reflect a similar amount of meritless 
reporting to be expected under the Dodd–Frank program. This 
                                                                                                     
 145. See id. (“She found that the . . . facility had a contaminated water 
system, an air system that allowed products to be cross-contaminated and pills 
of different strengths mixed in the same bottles . . . .”).  
 146. See id. (“Her lawyers, Neil Getnick and Leslie Ann Skillen, believe her 
share is the single-biggest whistle-blower award in the U.S. . . .”); see also Press 
Release, Getnick & Getnick, GlaxoSmithKiline Pays $750 Million For Fraud On 
Medicaid (Oct. 26, 2010), available at http://www.taf.org/Eckard-
Getick&Getnick-PR.pdf (stating that GSK was required to pay $600 million to 
settle the civil claims and a $150 million criminal penalty).  
 147. See Gardiner Harris, Pfizer to Pay $2.3 Billion to Settle Inquiry Over 
Marketing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2009, at B4 (stating that Kopchinski received 
more than $50 million for his role in the case and that a total of $102 million in 
bounties was paid to informants). 
 148. See, e.g., Bucy, States, supra note 59, at 1533 (“In short, despite its 
enormous success as a regulatory tool, the federal False Claims Act, because of 
its unique private-public partnership, creates tensions and costs for law 
enforcement, the courts, and businesses.”); Rich, supra note 121, at 1234 (“94% 
of qui tam FCA suits that the DOJ has allowed to proceed (totaling more than 
3,000 actions) have been dismissed without recovering any funds. These non-
meritorious suits have exacted a heavy toll on defendants, the judicial system, 
and the public as a whole.”). See generally Canni, supra note 94; Christina 
Broderick, Note, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An Empirical 
Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949 (2007); Justin P. Tschoepe, Comment, A Fraud 
Against One Is Apparently a Fraud Against All: The Fraud Enforcement and 
Recovery Act’s Unprecedented Expansion of Liability Under the False Claims 
Act, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 741 (2010).  
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follows because both programs function as whistleblower bounty 
provisions, and both have a similar percentage of recovery 
incentive structure.149 It seems reasonable to conclude, then, that 
meritless claims filed under the FCA are a reasonable guidepost to 
expected non-meritorious reporting under the Dodd–Frank 
program.  
The DOJ breaks down qui tam statistics into three categories: 
“active,” “settlement or judgment,” and “dismissed.”150 This Note 
takes the position that dismissed cases were non-meritorious 
claims. That position is based on the premise that meritorious 
claims would have been settled or proceeded to judgment, even if 
the judgment went against the relator. Although many argue that 
a significant amount of cases that settle also lack substantial 
merit,151 this Note views settlements in the light most favorable to 
relators. Dismissed cases, however, either were meritless and 
therefore did not warrant adjudication on the merits, or were 
somehow technically deficient.152 The former explanation seems 
                                                                                                     
 149. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text (stating that FCA 
relators are entitled to between 15%–30% of recovered proceeds); supra note 28 
and accompanying text (stating that whistleblowers under the Dodd–Frank 
program are entitled to between 10%–30% of recovered funds).  
 150. FRAUD STATISTICS, 2010, supra note 142, at 9.  
 151. See Beck, supra note 91, at 624–25 (“[I]t may be rational for an 
informer to pursue a claim, even if it seems unlikely to yield a victory on the 
merits. For instance, the case could prove to have a nuisance value, causing the 
defendant to settle to avoid the higher costs of defending a fraud claim.”). Cf. 
Denise N. Martin et al., Recent Trends IV: What Explains Filings and 
Settlements in Shareholder Class Actions, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 125 
(1999) (“The merits of most of these lawsuits . . . seem to be of relatively little, if 
any, importance in determining the amount of settlement.”). 
 152. See Broderick, supra note 148, at 972 (“[T]here are two primary reasons 
for dismissing a suit: Either it lacks merit or it is deficient on some technical 
ground.”). Another possible explanation for both dismissals, and the high 
dismissal rates in these qui tam actions, is voluntary dismissal after the 
government declines to intervene. Professor Bucy notes, “Historically, relators 
who proceed on their own after the DOJ has declined to intervene as a plaintiff 
have enjoyed little success. . . . The litigational advantages to private plaintiffs 
of obtaining DOJ intervention are so substantial that the acknowledged goal of 
any experienced relators’ attorney is to obtain the government’s intervention.” 
Bucy, Private Justice, supra note 11, at 51. Because the Government intervenes 
in only 22% of qui tam actions, this is a plausible explanation. FRAUD 
STATISTICS, 2010, supra note 142, at 9. But see Rich, supra note 121, at 1264 
(“[A] senior DOJ official acknowledged in remarks to a conference of health care 
lawyers that the merit of many non-intervened cases ‘has been questionable at 
best.’” (quoting Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney Gen., Remarks to 
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more likely in the FCA context for a host of reasons. First, the FCA 
statute mandates that the relators’ complaint and all material 
information be filed with the Attorney General before it is served 
on the defendant.153 This gives the DOJ an opportunity to review 
the complaint for any technical noncompliance, and rectify any 
errors.154 Second, since the 1986 amendments, a considerable “qui 
tam bar” has developed.155 These lawyers specialize in FCA 
litigation and devote considerable resources towards FCA claims; 
                                                                                                     
the American Health Lawyers Association Meeting (Sept. 30, 2002))). It is the 
opinion of this author that although some of these cases are being voluntarily 
dismissed, the extreme financial incentives provided by the Act lead the vast 
majority of cases to be dismissed non-voluntarily, and therefore the dismissal 
rates do reflect their non-meritorious nature. See Matthew, supra note 117, at 
293 (“Awards to plaintiffs of between $1 million and $10 million are announced 
regularly.”). Further, although the Government may dismiss any claim in which 
it has intervened over the objection of the relator per § 3730(c)(2)(A), that power 
is rarely used, despite a flood of articles calling for such action. See, e.g., Rich, 
supra note 121, at 1264–65 (“The result is that the government does not 
dismiss, and relators are permitted to proceed with, thousands of non-
meritorious qui tam suits.”); Matthew, supra note 117, at 285 (“The 
Government’s abdication of authority under the FCA results in over-prosecution 
and a harmful reduction in the Government’s exercise of caution in the selection 
and pursuit of these cases.”). Finally, as discussed supra, the reverse attorney’s 
fees provided for under the statute are rarely granted; therefore, there is little 
incentive to voluntarily dismiss a possibly lucrative case. See supra note 140 
and accompanying text (discussing the rarity with which reverse attorney’s fees 
are awarded).  
 153. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2006) (“A copy of the complaint and written 
disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information the person 
possesses shall be served on the Government[,] . . . shall remain under seal for 
at least 60 days, and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so 
orders.”).  
 154. See Broderick, supra note 148, at 973 (“During this review, the 
Attorney General has the opportunity to correct any technical errors in the 
complaint. According to Michael Bassham, Tennessee Assistant Attorney 
General, it is common for state attorneys general to correct such errors at this 
stage.”); supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing the Government’s 
ability to move for an indefinite number of continuances when deciding whether 
to intervene); see also Canni, supra note 94, at 2 (“[I]t is not uncommon for 
courts to grant plaintiffs leave to amend their complaints multiple times . . . .”).  
 155. The term “qui tam bar” refers to a set of attorneys or law firms that 
work predominantly on qui tam cases, it is a subset of the “plaintiff’s bar.” See, 
e.g., A. Craig Eddy, The Effect of the Health Insurance Profitability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) on Health Care Fraud in Montana, 61 MONT. 
L. REV. 175, 203 (2000) (“[T]he predominant target of qui tam actions recently 
shifted from defense contractors to health care providers and the plaintiff’s qui 
tam bar is growing rapidly.”).  
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their presence further undermines the idea that a substantial 
number of these claims are being dismissed due to technical 
defects.156 Finally, there is a general public policy in the law that 
cases be decided on the merits.157 Because of these reasons, 
dismissed qui tam claims are treated herein as presumptively 
meritless.  
As of 2010, the DOJ’s Fraud Statistics show that 74.4% of all 
qui tam actions filed under the FCA were dismissed without a 
settlement or judgment.158 Even more concerning, 94% of cases in 
which the Government did not intervene were dismissed.159 It is 
                                                                                                     
 156. See Beck, supra note 91, at 624 n.441 (“The FCA has spurred the 
growth of a ‘qui tam bar’ consisting of law firms that devote substantial 
resources to FCA litigation.”); ALICE G. GOSFIELD, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID 
FRAUD AND ABUSE § 6:12 (2011) (“The so-called ‘Qui Tam’ bar has attracted 
former federal and state prosecutors, employment lawyers, class action lawyers 
and other lawyers skilled in complex, multi-district, high stakes civil 
litigation. . . . The sophistication and training of the bar has led to bigger and 
larger cases being brought, litigated and ultimately settled.”).  
 157. See Quinonez v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 540 F.2d 824, 826–27 
(5th Cir. 1976) (restating the “universal rule” that motions to dismiss should 
rarely be granted (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)); 
Muncaster v. Baptist, 367 F. Supp. 1120, 1124 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (“[T]he granting 
of motions to dismiss . . . is not favored.”); Carss v. Outboard Marine Corp., 252 
F.2d 690, 691 (5th Cir. 1958) (“‘[C]ases are generally to be tried on the proofs 
rather than the pleadings.’” (quoting Des Isles v. Evans, 200 F.2d 614, 616 (5th 
Cir. 1952))). Contra Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) 
(overturning Conley’s “no set of facts” standard and announcing a “plausibility” 
pleading standard); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (applying the 
Twombly “plausibility” pleading standard). But see Patricia W. Hatamyar, The 
Toa of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 
553, 587 n.209 (2010) (“In addition, claims other than common law fraud that 
allege some sort of underlying deception, such as securities fraud, RICO, and 
qui tam actions under the False Claims Act, must also be pled with 
particularity. Such cases are not governed by Twombly and Iqbal . . . .”); William 
M. Janssen, Iqbal “Plausibility” in Pharmaceutical and Medical Device 
Litigation, 71 LA. L. REV. 541, 543, 587 (2011) (finding that Iqbal “plausibility” 
pleading was not a factor in 80% of the pharmaceutical and medical device 
dismissals studied, some of which involved False Claims Act claims). In any 
event, the underlying effect of the Twombly–Iqbal line of cases is likely marginal 
as those were not decided until 2007 and 2009 respectively, and the FCA 
dismissal data covers from 1987 to the present. See FRAUD STATISTICS, 2010, 
supra note 142, at 9 (covering 1987–2010). 
 158. See FRAUD STATISTICS, 2010, supra note 142, at 9 (reporting that of the 
5,404 total qui tam actions which had been resolved (i.e., those cases not “under 
investigation” or “active”) 4,022 of them were dismissed).  
 159. See id. (reporting that 3,962 of the 4,628 non-intervened cases were 
dismissed, with 412 cases still active). I arrived at this statistic by subtracting 
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important to note that although in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
qui tam claims were significantly outpaced by government 
instituted (non-qui tam) claims,160 since the year 2000 qui tam 
claims account for 78.5% of all claims instituted under the FCA.161 
To summarize, nearly 75% of all qui tam actions are dismissed 
without an award, and qui tam claims account for nearly 80% of 
the FCA actions brought since the year 2000.162  
These are truly startling statistics. Further, one must keep in 
mind that in FCA qui tam actions the relator is charged with doing 
much more than simply reporting on wrongdoing; these 
whistleblowers are required to file a complaint with a court163 and 
hire a lawyer.164 This is a much higher burden than Dodd–Frank 
will require, where all the potential whistleblower is required to do 
is simply submit the information to an online collection system or 
fill out a form and mail or fax it to the SEC Whistleblower 
Office.165 
                                                                                                     
the number of active cases from the total, then dividing the number of non-
intervened dismissed actions by that total, which resulted in a statistic of 
93.975%. This approach appears to be the same as that used by Professor Rich 
in his Article cited supra note 121.  
 160. See FRAUD STATISTICS, 2010, supra note 142, at 1 (reporting that from 
1987–1994 non-qui tam claims accounted for 73% of all FCA claims).  
 161. Id. at 2.  
 162. Over the entire span since 1987, qui tam claims account for 63.4% of all 
FCA claims. Id. Unfortunately the DOJ does not break down dismissal rates by 
year, but rather only provide statistics relating to all qui tam actions since 1987. 
Id. at 9. This is why dismissal rates over the relevant periods discussed above 
are not provided.  
 163. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b), (b)(2) (2006) (stating that the complaint shall 
be filed with the court in camera).  
 164. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Mergent Sers. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 
2008) (“Because relators lack a personal interest in False Claims Act qui tam 
actions, we conclude that they are not entitled to proceed pro se.”); Timson v. 
Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he district court did not err in 
dismissing Timson’s complaint because Timson could not maintain a qui tam 
suit under the FCA as a pro se relator.”); U.S. ex rel. Brooks v. Lockheed Martin 
Corp., 237 F. App’x 802, 803 (4th Cir. 2007) (“A lay person may not bring a qui 
tam action under the False Claims Act. Although a qui tam relator is entitled by 
statute to a share of the recovery if his action is successful, the United States is 
the real party in interest . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).  
 165. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–9(a) (2011) (“[Y]ou must submit your information 
about a possible securities law violation by either of these methods: (1) Online, 
through the Commission’s Web site located at http://www.sec.gov; or (2) By 
mailing or faxing a Form TCR . . . to the SEC Office of the Whistleblower . . . .”).  
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It does not, therefore, take a substantial leap of logic to infer 
that, as reflected in the qui tam dismissal data, somewhere 
between 75%–94% of reports submitted under the Dodd–Frank 
program will be non-meritorious. In fact, because simple 
submission of a report of wrongdoing is more akin to those qui tam 
claims in which the government does not intervene, the 94% figure 
may be the more likely result.166 
2. Inherent Issues  
Although many of the problems that commentators typically 
lament about the FCA will not be present under the Dodd–Frank 
program because it is not a qui tam program,167 some problems 
remain quite important, as they likely will apply in the Dodd–
Frank arena as well.  
                                                                                                     
 166. This conclusion is based on the idea that in non-intervened cases the 
relator is functioning independently of the government. See 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(c)(3) (2006) (“If the Government elects not to proceed with the action, the 
person who initiated the action shall have the right to conduct the action.”). This 
is similar to what Dodd–Frank whistleblowers will be doing when submitting 
their initial information.  
 167. There are several consistently decried FCA issues unlikely to apply in 
the Dodd–Frank context: First, broad piecemeal expansion of liability driven by 
relator’s novel legal theories. See Rich, supra note 121, at 1236–37 (“[N]on-
intervened qui tam suits that do result in recovery present a different problem: 
the haphazard expansion of FCA liability without any guarantee that new 
theories of liability will work to the public’s benefit.”). Second, the prevention of 
companies from contracting with the government. See William E. Kovacic, The 
Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation in Government 
Procurement Markets, 6. SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 201, 223–35 (1998) (discussing a 
survey of forty government contractors, which found that increased compliance 
costs and huge potential liability were threats to continued operation in 
government contracting). Lastly, because FCA liability can be predicated on 
“technical” violations of government regulations, and relators can still recover 
the minimum $5,500 per “false” claim plus treble any damages, some 
commentators claim relators’ interests are at odds with the Government’s. See 
id. at 223 (“Where relators challenge behavior that involves no injury to the 
public, and where the fact of a challenge itself may be counterproductive, the 
‘relator’s interests and the Government’s do not necessarily coincide.’” (citing 
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 n.5 (1997))); 
Beck, supra note 91, at 630–31 (“Any failure to comply with the vast array of 
federal regulations governing procurement might be the basis of a qui tam 
complaint.”).  
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The most notable of these inherent issues is the intrinsic 
conflict of interest between the relator’s (or whistleblower’s) 
interests and those of the government or public.168 This 
phenomenon can be termed “nurturing unlawful conduct,”169 and it 
results from the fact that in whistleblower bounty situations, such 
as the FCA, IRS, and Dodd–Frank programs, the whistleblower’s 
compensation is tied directly to the amount of damages or 
unlawful conduct present.170 Therefore, putative whistleblowers 
have an incentive to allow damages to build up, thereby increasing 
the total amount of damages from which their compensation 
percentage will be based.171 The Sixth Circuit faced just such a 
situation in a case where the FCA relator first contacted his 
attorneys in 1987 when damages were at $13.1 million but delayed 
filing suit until the damages against the government had more 
than tripled to $41.6 million, meaning the relator’s bounty had 
more than tripled as well.172 
                                                                                                     
 168. See Beck, supra note 91, at 633 (“The public adopts a regulatory 
command because it wants the proscribed behavior to decrease. On the other 
hand, the informer makes a living from the illegal conduct, and, therefore, the 
informer’s interests are advanced by an increase in the number and severity of 
statutory violations.” (internal citations omitted)).  
 169. Id.  
 170. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1), (d)(2) (2006) (stating a bounty of 15%–30% 
under the FCA); I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2006) (establishing a 15%–30% bounty for 
IRS collections over $2 million); Dodd–Frank § 922(b)(1) (establishing a 10%–
30% bounty for all SEC collections over $1 million).   
 171. See Beck, supra note 91, at 633 (“[T]he informer makes a living from 
the illegal conduct, and, therefore, the informer’s interests are advanced by an 
increase in the number and severity of statutory violations.”); Id. at 635 (“The 
informer, however, is paid based on the amount of fraud he proves. Thus . . . it is 
in the informer’s financial interest for the government to be damaged to the 
greatest extent possible before the scheme is brought to light.”). Cf. RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 661 (7th ed. 2007) (“The incentive for 
waiting would be to obtain greater compensation, since the penalty for the 
completed crime would be heavier than the penalty for the attempt.”). Judge 
Posner also notes a possible “supply” conflict of interest in private enforcement 
situations, he notes, “The private enforcer would presumably be paid per 
offender convicted . . . . There are several ways in which the enforcer could 
increase his ‘catch,’ and hence his income . . . . He could fabricate an offense . . . 
or encourage an individual to commit an offense that he would not have 
committed without encouragement . . . .” Id.  
 172. See U.S. ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. General Elec. Co., 41 F.3d 
1032, 1037–39 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that the relator contacted his attorneys in 
mid-1987 but did not file suit until 1990, after substantial damages had 
compiled). The court remanded the case to determine whether the relator was 
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The rules promulgated by the SEC for the Dodd–Frank 
program only obliquely reference this inherent issue of 
unnecessary delay. The only mention of it is in the comments to 
the rule defining “independent knowledge,” and it simply relates to 
allowing certain persons with oversight and governance 
responsibilities (who would be excluded from the definition of 
independent knowledge) to make a claim if the company acted in 
bad faith in not reporting or remedying the violation.173 This is a 
major oversight; the SEC should promulgate rules substantially 
reducing the whistleblower’s share if purposeful delay is found. 
This recommendation is explained further infra Part IV.B.  
The next inherent issue is the increased transaction costs for 
both regulated entities and the government. The experience with 
the FCA is illustrative of this issue. A senior DOJ official testified 
before a Congressional committee that between 1987 and 1992 the 
Civil Division spent “20,000 hours investigating . . . 150 qui tam 
cases that were [later] dismissed by the courts or not pursued after 
we declined to intervene.”174 And this figure does not account for 
additional time expended by Assistant U.S. Attorneys or other 
government officials such as the Defense Contract Audit Agency 
and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations.175 While the 
relator or whistleblower that submits such a meritless claim loses 
little, the government and the public must foot the bill.176  
                                                                                                     
“running up costs.” Id. at 1044.  
 173. See SEC, Proposed Rules, supra note 23, at 70494 (“[I]f the entity did 
not disclose the information to the Commission within a reasonable time or 
proceeded in bad faith, these exclusions would no longer apply, thereby making 
an individual who knows this undisclosed information eligible to become a 
whistleblower by providing ‘independent knowledge’ of the violations.”); 17 
C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(b)(v) (2011) (listing exceptions to the exclusions from 
“independent knowledge”).  
 174. False Claims Act Technical Amendments of 1992: Hearing on H.R. 4563 
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 25 (1992) (Sup. Docs. No. Y4.J89/1:102/49) 
(statement of Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, 
Department of Justice) [hereinafter Gerson Testimony]. 
 175. See id. at 25–26 (“Assistant U.S. Attorneys spent additional, 
unrecorded time on these matters.”); Beck, supra note 91, at 627 (“[T]his total 
did not include time spent by other government investigators, such as 
employees of the Defense Contract Audit Agency and the Air Force Office of 
Special Investigations.”).  
 176. See Beck, supra note 91, at 627 (“If the government finds evidence of 
fraud, the informer can claim a share of the recovery. If not, the investigation 
1234 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1201 (2012) 
This inherent issue highlights the need for the SEC to further 
disincentivize meritless reporting under the Dodd–Frank 
program.177 This is especially true with Dodd–Frank where the 
SEC is likely to receive thousands of reports,178 whereas here the 
DOJ was only dealing with 150 meritless claims and still resulted 
in significant labor outlays by the Department.179 Because the 
Dodd–Frank program’s incentives are likely to cause the SEC to be 
overrun with claims,180 limiting the amount of meritless claims is 
in the SEC’s own interest.181 
                                                                                                     
has cost the informer little. The costs of a government investigation matter a 
great deal to the public, however, because tax dollars pay the salaries of law 
enforcement personnel.”).  
 177. See Jayne W. Barnard, Evolutionary Enforcement at the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 403, 413 (2010) (“Bounties may also 
increase demands on regulatory staff, who not only have to sift through 
informants’ tips, but also may have to determine just how much a piece of 
information is worth . . . .”); infra Part IV (proposing new rules to disincentivize 
meritless reporting).  
 178. See supra Part III.A (discussing the IRS bounty program and 
prognosticating a similar, if not increased, amount of reporting under Dodd–
Frank); see also Sue Reisinger, Firms Face a Sudden Rush of Whistleblower 
Claims, CORPORATE COUNSEL, Sept. 9, 2010, available at http://www.law.com/ 
jsp/article.jsp?id=1202471768561 (“The new federal whistleblower law is 
proving a hot item for many plaintiff law firms. Attorneys say that tipsters with 
visions of becoming millionaires are flooding their offices with calls.”).  
 179. Although the Attorney General is required by statute to 
“diligently . . . investigate” all claims under the FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a), and no 
similar duty is required of the SEC by Dodd–Frank, it seems quite likely that 
significant effort will have to be expended in investigating claims submitted to 
the SEC Whistleblower Office. Therefore, these statistics, while not perfectly 
analogous, do provide some baseline expectations.  
 180. See, e.g., Jessica Holzer & Fawn Johnson, Larger Bounties Spur Surge 
in Fraud Tips, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2010, at C3 (“[T]he guaranteed minimum 
payout for whistle-blowers who qualify, [is] encouraging insiders to step 
forward, said Erika Kelton of Phillips & Cohen LLP. ‘We’re seeing a flood of 
inquiries,’ . . . .”).  
 181. See Barnard, supra note 177, at 412 (“The biggest objection to adoption 
of an SEC bounty program, as was the case in 1988, will be that the 
Enforcement Division already receives more tips than it can reasonably handle.” 
(citations omitted)). Cf. Bruce Carton, Pitfalls Emerge in Dodd–Frank 
Whistleblower Bounty Provision, SECURITIES DOCKET, Sept. 9, 2010, available at 
http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2010/09/09/pitfalls-emerge-in-dodd-frank-
whistleblower-bounty-provision/ (“Contending with a barrage of borderline (or 
worse) claims will prove quite costly to the SEC, which will still be required to 
review each matter submitted to it.”).  
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Further, increased transaction and compliance costs are sure 
to inure to regulated entities, just as they have to companies to 
which the FCA applies.182 One 1998 survey of government 
contractors showed that in defending thirty-eight qui tam FCA 
claims, the respondents expended over $53 million on outside legal 
costs, whereas total recoveries only amounted to just over $3.5 
million.183 Internal and other costs of defending such matters are 
estimated to equal, if not exceed, those expended on legal fees.184 
This data clearly indicates that the costs associated with 
responding to such suits are substantial.  
Although Dodd–Frank has no qui tam provision, and therefore 
the number of actual cases instituted against regulated entities 
should be lower, similar financial incentives for the whistleblower 
are at play, and therefore a significant amount of non-meritorious 
reporting is likely.185 While not all of these reports will lead to 
trials, the costs of responding to any investigation launched by the 
SEC is sure to be considerable.186 Due to this, non-meritorious 
                                                                                                     
 182. See Bucy, States, supra note 59, at 1532–33 (“FCA actions can also hurt 
legitimate businesses. It is extremely costly for a company to respond to an FCA 
action. . . . When a fraud investigation becomes public, business expansions, 
corporate borrowing, and mergers and acquisitions may be put on hold or lost as 
opportunities.”); Canni, supra note 94, at 12 (“These huge costs may ultimately 
put the contractor out of business and result in a loss in jobs, cause the 
contractor to raise his prices, or discourage future involvement with the 
Government.”); Kovacic, supra note 167, at 225 (“[T]he survey data suggest that 
contractors incur out-of-pocket legal costs of at least $250,000 to $500,000 
whenever the firm is informed that the government has commenced an inquiry 
into alleged []FCA violations or a qui tam relator has filed a suit.”).  
 183. See Kovacic, supra note 167, at 226 (“To defend themselves in these 38 
completed matters, the survey respondents spent approximately $53,403,000 on 
external legal costs. The total amount of CFCA recoveries obtained in these 
matters was $3,694,484. The average expenditure in outside legal fees . . . was 
$1,431,660, and the average CFCA recovery was $97,223.” (citations omitted)).  
 184. See id. at 225 (stating that “amounts paid to external professional 
advisors quickly exceed $1 million and, in a number of cases, reach $10 million 
or more” and that “the internal economic costs to the firm match or surpass the 
costs associated with retaining external professional advisors such as law 
firms”).  
 185. See supra notes 158–66 and accompanying text (referencing dismissal 
rates of the FCA and predicting similar amounts of meritless reporting under 
Dodd–Frank).  
 186. Cf. Bucy, States, supra note 59, at 1533 (reporting in the FCA context, 
“When an investigation or lawsuit is nonmeritorious, the tangible and 
intangible costs to the targeted company are not only substantial but also 
unnecessary”). The article continues, “The threat of nonmeritorious actions, 
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reporting should be disincentivized through an SEC rule holding 
the whistleblower and government jointly liable to the regulated 
entity for its reasonable attorney’s fees that are incurred in the 
successful defense of any “related action” (as defined by the SEC 
rules)187 that is found to be frivolous.188 This recommendation is 
defined further infra Part IV.A.  
C. State False Claims Acts 
As Justice Brandeis so poignantly stated, “It is one of the 
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory.”189 Currently 
twenty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the cities of 
Chicago and New York, all have their own versions of the False 
Claims Act.190 Many of these were passed in the wake of federal 
legislation191 that provided states with an additional 10% of federal 
Medicaid fraud recoveries.192 Each state’s version varies in 
                                                                                                     
brought by any of thousands of potential relators, creates uncertainty for 
businesses and often causes businesses to engage in unnecessarily extensive 
and expensive preventative programs.” Id.   
 187. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–3(b)(1) (2011) (“A related action is a judicial or 
administrative action that is brought by: (i) The Attorney General of the United 
States; (ii) An appropriate regulatory authority; (iii) A self-regulatory 
organization; or (iv) A state attorney general in a criminal case. . . .”). 
 188. See infra Part IV (describing further the proposed rule and definition of 
“frivolous”).  
 189. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 386–87 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting).  
 190. See Taxpayers Against Fraud, State False Claims Acts, 
http://www.taf.org/statefca.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (listing California, 
Colorado Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin; some of 
these are Medicaid only) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 191. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat 4 (2006).  
 192. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396h(a) (2006) (“[I]f a State has in effect a law relating 
to false or fraudulent claims . . . the Federal medical assistance percentage with 
respect to any amounts recovered under a State action brought under such law, 
shall be decreased by 10 percentage points.”); Bucy, States, supra note 59, at 
1546 (“[H]aving a state qui tam statute will result in the federal government’s 
decreasing the FMAP from fifty to forty percent for a Medicaid fraud settlement, 
thereby increasing the state’s portion of the recovery to sixty percent of the 
settlement or judgment . . . .”); Id. at 1535 (“Many of the state false claims 
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different ways from the federal FCA;193 however, some of these 
differences are of particular note here, as they reflect positive 
evolutions applicable not only to the federal FCA, but also to the 
Dodd–Frank whistleblower bounty program. Some of the systemic 
changes not applicable to Dodd–Frank include changes such as 
either removing private qui tam actions altogether194 or greatly 
restricting them.195 Because Dodd–Frank does not provide a 
private cause of action, the value, or lack thereof, of a qui tam 
provision is of little moment here.  
The most notable difference in many state FCAs is the 
existence of an internal reporting requirement.196 These 
requirements almost exclusively apply only to current or former 
government employees who discovered the fraud during the course 
of their employment.197 Typically these provisions require good-
                                                                                                     
statutes, however, are of very recent vintage. States have passed or significantly 
amended ten of the twenty-four since 2005 when Congress provided a financial 
incentive for states to pass FCAs that mirror the federal FCA.”).  
 193. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 15C.02(e) (2010) (“An employer is not liable for 
an act committed by a nonmanagerial employee that violates this section, unless 
the employer had knowledge of the act, ratified the act, or was reckless in the 
hiring or supervision of the employee.”). No such similar exclusion exists under 
the Federal FCA. See also Bucy, States, supra note 59, at 1536 (“Of the twenty-
four states with qui tam statutes, fifteen statutes apply to any type of false 
claim against the state, but the remaining nine statutes limit claims to health 
care or Medicaid fraud.”).  
 194. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7504(b) (2011) (“[N]othing in this act 
shall be construed to create a private cause of action.”).  
 195. See, e.g., Scachitti v. UBS Fin. Servs., 831 N.E.2d 544, 554 (Ill. 2005) 
(interpreting the Illinois FCA and finding that only “the Attorney General has 
the exclusive constitutional authority to represent the state,” thereby 
eliminating standing for qui tam plaintiffs to bring claims on their own).  
 196. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 2-381.03 (2011) (“No present or former employee 
of the District . . . may bring an action pursuant to subsection (b) of this 
section . . . unless that employee first in good faith exhausted internal 
procedures for reporting and seeking recovery of such falsely claimed 
sums . . . .”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 661-27(e)(2) (2011) (“In no event may a person 
bring an action under section 661-25: When the person is a present or former 
employee of the State . . . unless the employee first, in good faith, exhausted any 
existing internal procedures for reporting and seeking recovery of the falsely 
claimed sums . . . .”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 357.090 (2010) (“No action may be 
maintained pursuant to NRS 357.080 that is based upon information discovered 
by a present or former employee of the State . . . unless he or she first in good 
faith exhausted internal procedures for reporting and seeking recovery of the 
proceeds of the fraudulent activity . . . .”).  
 197. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE 12652(d)(4) (West 2011) (“No court shall have 
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faith exhaustion of all internal reporting procedures before the 
government employee can file the qui tam suit.198 This type of 
internal reporting requirement should be included in the Dodd–
Frank program. It would further reduce non-meritorious claims 
and put the regulated entity on notice of possible securities 
violations.199 Because an underlying value of Dodd–Frank is the 
protection of whistleblower anonymity,200 having the 
whistleblower’s attorney file the internal report on behalf of the 
unnamed whistleblower could fulfill this internal reporting 
requirement.201  
A total exhaustion of internal channels is, in this author’s 
opinion, too high a burden on putative whistleblowers. Simply 
requiring that some sort of internal reporting has occurred, 
however, would not be a substantial hurdle and would further the 
larger public policy concerns of receiving the best quality, 
meritorious tips from informants,202 while discouraging informants 
with only specious information.203  
                                                                                                     
jurisdiction over an action brought under subdivision (c) based upon information 
discovered by a present or former employee of the state or a political subdivision 
during the course of his or her employment . . . .”).  
 198. See e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 661-27(e)(2) (2011) (“In no event may a 
person bring an action under section 661-25 . . . unless the employee first, in 
good faith, exhausted any existing internal procedures for reporting and seeking 
recovery of the falsely claimed sums . . . .”).  
 199. See infra Part III.D.3 (explaining how internal reporting would reduce 
meritless claims by allowing employers to respond to them first).  
 200. See Dodd–Frank § 922(d)(1)(A) (“Any whistleblower who anonymously 
makes a claim for an award under subsection (b) shall be represented by counsel 
if the whistleblower anonymously submits the information upon which the claim 
is based.”); Id. § 922(h)(2)(A) (“[T]he Commission and any officer or employee of 
the Commission shall not disclose any information, including information 
provided by a whistleblower to the Commission, which could reasonably be 
expected to reveal the identity of a whistleblower . . . .”).  
 201. See also infra Part III.D (discussing the internal reporting requirement 
in the context of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act).  
 202. See SEC, Proposed Rules, supra note 23, at 70496 (“The Commission’s 
primary goal, consistent with the congressional intent behind [Dodd–Frank], is 
to encourage the submission of high-quality information to facilitate the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the Commission’s enforcement program.”). 
 203. The internal reporting requirement is examined further infra Part 
III.D and Part IV.C.  
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Another extremely important recommendation from a state 
FCA is drawn from the pre-2009 version of the Florida FCA.204 
Under that version of the Act, if the government did not intervene 
and the defendant was successful in defending against the suit, 
then the “court shall award the defendant reasonable attorney’s 
fees and costs against the person bringing the action.”205 This 
provision would be an extreme deterrent to specious tips and 
would greatly disincentivize non-meritorious reporting; an 
analogous provision should be included in the Dodd–Frank 
program. This recommendation is explored in further detail infra 
Part IV.A.  
The Minnesota FCA206 has a “right to cure”207 provision.208 
This allows defendants to escape liability if they repay the amount 
of actual damages within forty-five days of being informed of the 
                                                                                                     
 204. FLA. STAT. §§ 68.081–68.092 (2011) (establishing the Florida False 
Claims Act).  
 205. FLA. STAT. § 68.086(3) (2008). This provision appears to have been 
changed not because it was too effective or improperly administered, but rather 
solely in order for the Florida FCA to become DRA compliant and therefore 
qualify for the incentives noted supra note 192. See Bucy, States, supra note 59, 
at 1531 (“Congress passed legislation in 2006 that offers financial rewards to 
states that enact statutes patterned after the federal FCA.”). The article 
continues:  
If a state passes a false claim act that is ‘at least as effective in 
rewarding and facilitating qui tam actions’ as the federal FCA, the 
state receives a ten percent reduction in the amount it owes to the 
federal government for the federal portion of any Medicaid fraud 
recovery the state obtains. This provision went into effect on January 
1, 2007.  
Id. (citations omitted). Florida’s responses to Professor Bucy’s FCA 
questionnaire note that the Florida FCA has been amended several times to 
comply with the Federal FCA. See id. at 1565–66 (stating that the Florida FCA 
provisions relating to the statute of limitations, penalty levels, and “[t]he time a 
new filing is initially under seal,” were all “amended to conform with the 
Federal Act,” and that the reason for the changes was “to comply with DRA”). 
 206. See MINN. STAT. §§ 15C.01–15C.16 (2011) (establishing the Minnesota 
False Claims Act).  
 207. Marc Raspanti & Pamela Brecht, The Minnesota False Claims Act: Is It 
Minnesota Nice?, 67 BENCH & B. MINN. 20, 21 (2010) (“Another significant 
provision, which is not contained within the federal False Claims Act, is 
Minnesota’s ‘Right to Cure’ provision.”).  
 208. See MINN. STAT. § 15C.02(f)(2) (2010) (“[A] person is not liable under 
this section if . . . the person repays the amount of actual damages to the state 
or the political subdivision within 45 days after being so informed.”).  
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underlying violation.209 Although there is some logical appeal to 
this kind of provision for Dodd–Frank, it is unlikely to work for 
securities violations where the underlying damages would likely 
inure to shareholders,210 thereby making expedient repayment 
very difficult. Additionally, measuring the amount of “actual 
damages” to those shareholders would be much more difficult than 
is seen in the FCA context.211 
Some municipalities have also adopted FCAs.212 One county in 
Florida has certain “escape provisions”213 that allow defendants to 
escape liability if they meet specified criteria, such as: “reasonably 
                                                                                                     
 209. Id.  
 210. See Complaint at 8, United States v. Madoff, 2009 WL 596981 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (NO. 09CR213) (alleging violations of “Title 17, Code of Federal 
Regulations, Section 240.10b-5, by: (a) employing devices, schemes, and artifices 
to defraud; (b) making untrue statements of material facts . . . .”). A 10b-5 action 
makes it illegal to use “any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or 
of the mails” to defraud investors in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). This section has been interpreted to 
provide a private right of action and is often used by shareholders to initiate 
shareholder derivative suits. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430–31 
(1964), abrogated on other grounds by Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 
(2001) (“It appears clear that private parties have a right under s 27 to bring 
suit for violation of s 14(a) of the Act. . . [W]e believe that a right of action exists 
as to both derivative and direct causes.”); see also e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 
485 U.S. 224, 228 (1988) (“Respondents are former Basic shareholders . . . . 
Respondents brought a class action against Basic and its directors, asserting 
that the defendants issued three false or misleading public statements and 
thereby were in violation of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and of Rule 10b-5.”). See 
generally Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: 
Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 
10B-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (2008) (providing an overview of 10b-5 
litigation).  
 211. See, e.g., Kevin McCoy, Few Madoff Victims Reimbursed as Many Await 
Ruling on Claims, USA TODAY, Dec. 10, 2009, at 1B (“Court trustee Irving 
Picard is seeking Madoff assets to repay victims. He’s collected $1.4 billion so 
far, and has filed lawsuits seeking nearly $15 billion. But there are $19.4 billion 
in estimated losses.” (emphasis added)). 
 212. See, e.g., supra note 190 and accompanying text (stating that Chicago 
and New York City have False Claims Acts); MIAMI DADE COUNTY, FLA, 
ORDINANCE, ch. 21, art. XV, §§ 21-255–21-266 (2012), available at 
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=10620&stateId=9&stateName=
Florida (establishing a FCA for Miami-Dade County).  
 213. See Edward J. Kinberg, The Impact of Federal, State, and Local False 
Claims Acts on the Construction Industry, 84 FLA. B. J. 48, 52 (Oct. 2010) 
(“However, these ‘escape’ provisions also give MDC a very strong hammer to use 
to discourage contractors from pursuing a claim.”).  
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believing that such claim was free of any material misstatements,” 
“no reasonable basis to doubt the truth, veracity, or accuracy of 
such claim,” or the “claimant diligently investigated the facts 
underlying such claim and prepared the claim in a reasonable 
manner.”214 Defendants, however, only have five days to cure the 
claim under any of these exceptions.215 These exceptions seem to be 
addressing a common complaint amongst FCA critics regarding 
over-enforcement, especially of technical violations.216 While this 
issue could become a problem in the Dodd–Frank context, until the 
program produces some empirical data, it is impossible to 
prognosticate whether over-enforcement will be an issue. 
Therefore, while some version of an “escape” provision may be 
warranted in the future, it is not necessary at this point.217  
                                                                                                     
 214. MIAMI DADE COUNTY, FLA, ORDINANCE, ch. 21, art. XV, § 21-266(1)–(3) 
(2012), available at http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=10620 
&stateId=9&stateName=Florida. 
 215. See id. § 21-266(4) (“When information indicating that any 
element . . . in the claim was false or misleading first became available, such 
claimant, within five (5) business days of discovering the falsity of the claim, 
took immediate steps to modify, correct, or withdraw such claim and 
provided . . . immediate notice thereof.”).  
 216. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 
(1997) (“Qui tam relators are thus less likely than is the Government to forgo an 
action arguably based on a mere technical noncompliance with reporting 
requirements that involved no harm to the public fisc.”); Beck, supra note 91, at 
630 (“From the informer’s perspective, however, it makes little difference 
whether a particular case is a wise application of the False Claims Act. Any 
reckless misstatement in a document submitted to the government might 
generate a bounty, whether or not the defendant meant to defraud the public.” 
(citations omitted)).  
 217. The over-enforcement/technical-violation critique seems to arise chiefly 
in the qui tam context. See Kovacic, supra note 167, at 223 (“These passages 
from Schumer implicitly recognize that qui tam oversight can elicit excessively 
aggressive enforcement of certain legal commands. There may be numerous 
instances in which compliance with a nominal legal command . . . may 
undermine rather than enhance the public interest.”). Because Dodd–Frank 
contains no qui tam provision, and enforcement will be left to the SEC, a good 
faith “escape” provision may not ever be necessary. The lack of oversight by the 
government that is consistently condemned in the FCA context should not be an 
issue under Dodd–Frank because the SEC and other government actors are 
completely responsible for litigating all actions under the program. See Rich, 
supra note 121, at 1278 (“Much of the blame for these problems is put on 
relators . . . . The problem instead lies with the DOJ, which is failing to 
counterbalance the financial motivations of the relator with its own 
considerations of how FCA actions can best serve the public interest.”); supra 
notes 22–27, 37–45 and accompanying text (defining “covered actions” and 
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D. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and Internal Reporting Requirements 
1. Sarbanes–Oxley 
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act218 (SOX) was passed in the wake of 
the Enron and WorldCom scandals.219 It set out various provisions 
requiring publically held companies to have independent directors, 
audit committees, and numerous other changes to corporate 
governance.220 Of particular relevance to this Note, one section also 
addresses the whistleblower context.  
Section 301(4) requires the “audit committees”221 of all 
companies subject to SOX to establish procedures for “the receipt, 
retention, and treatment of complaints received by the issuer 
regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing 
matters” and for the “confidential, anonymous submission by 
employees of the issuer of concerns regarding questionable 
accounting or auditing matters.”222 This provision was included to 
decrease fraud through employee reporting or whistleblowing.223 
                                                                                                     
“related actions” as used in Dodd–Frank).  
 218. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(2002) [hereinafter Sarbanes–Oxley] (establishing increased disclosure and 
accounting requirements for publically held companies).  
 219. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of 
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005) (“SOX was 
enacted in a flurry of congressional activity in the runup to the midterm 2002 
congressional elections after the spectacular failures of the once highly regarded 
firms Enron and WorldCom.”).  
 220. See, e.g., id. at 1529, 1538 (stating, for example, “[s]ection 301 of SOX 
requires all listed companies to have audit committees composed entirely of 
independent directors, as defined by Congress” and “[s]ection 402(a) of SOX 
prohibits corporations from arranging or extending credit to executive officers or 
directors”).  
 221. The “audit committee” is defined by the statute as “a committee (or 
equivalent body) established by and amongst the board of directors of an issuer 
for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial reporting processes of 
the issuer and audits of the financial statements of the issuer . . . .” Sarbanes–
Oxley § 2(a)(3) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7201(3)(A) (2006)).   
 222. Sarbanes–Oxley § 301(4) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 
(2006)).  
 223. See Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, 
Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act for Employment 
Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1056 (2004) (“One of the major purposes of 
Sarbanes–Oxley is to promote the flow of accurate information to investors so 
that they can make informed decisions about how to allocate their resources. 
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The provision has led to the establishment of “whistleblower 
hotlines,” where employees who become aware of fraud can report 
it.224 The Act also provides substantial retaliation protections for 
employees who report corporate malfeasance either internally to 
the company or externally to government officials225 and makes it a 
federal crime to retaliate against whistleblowers that report to law 
enforcement.226 
The requirement to institute such internal reporting 
mechanisms is not phrased in discretionary terms; all companies 
subject to SOX must institute them.227 In reaction to this federal 
mandate and in order to avoid any possible liability and delisting, 
companies instituted internal reporting mechanisms.228 The cost of 
                                                                                                     
The whistleblowing provisions advance this purpose in that, if effective, they 
will reduce the amount of fraudulent financial information.” (citations omitted)).  
 224. See Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Sarbanes–Oxley Whistleblower Hotlines 
Across Europe: Directions Through the Maze, 42 INT’L LAW. 1, 1 (2008) (“One 
discrete, and seemingly-straightforward, aspect of SOX and its Section 301 
mandate [is] that audit committees offer ‘confidential, anonymous employee 
complaint procedures,’ colloquially called whistleblower hotlines.”).  
 225. See Sarbanes–Oxley § 806(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006)) 
(stating that no company shall “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or 
in any other manner discriminate against an employee” for providing 
information about violations of the securities laws to “a Federal regulatory or 
law enforcement agency,” “any Member of Congress,” or “a person with 
supervisory authority over the employee”); see also Cherry, supra note 223, at 
1064 (“Under § 806 of Sarbanes–Oxley, whistleblowers who report instances of 
fraud internally or to governmental agencies are statutorily protected from 
retaliation if they work at publicly traded companies.”); id. at 1065 (“[T]he Act 
protects whistleblowers who make internal reports of violations, as long as those 
reports are made to a supervisor or another individual within the 
organization. . . . Externally, the law covers reports to government agencies, 
such as the SEC.”).  
 226. See Sarbanes–Oxley § 1107(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2006)) 
(stating that “[w]hoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate” takes any action 
harmful to any person, including interference with employment, “for providing 
to a law enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the 
commission” of any “Federal offense, shall be fined” or “imprisoned not more 
than 10 years, or both”). 
 227. See Sarbanes–Oxley § 301(4) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 
(2006)) (“Each audit committee shall establish procedures for—(A) the receipt, 
retention, and treatment of complaints . . . .” (emphasis added)); Cherry, supra 
note 223 at 1069 (“This is not phrased in discretionary terms—every publicly 
traded company must have a system in place for receiving anonymous 
complaints.”).   
 228. See Richard Moberly, Sarbanes–Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage 
Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1107, 1139 (“The Act instructs 
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complying with SOX is significant.229 In 2009, an SEC report found 
that the average compliance cost for companies with a “public 
float”230 of more than $75 million was $2.33 million per year.231 For 
companies with a public float of less than $75 million, the average 
was $690,000 per year.232 Granted, only a portion of these costs are 
associated with the implementation and operation of the internal 
reporting systems; however, it does represent some portion of those 
totals, and the potential liability and other “soft” costs are 
considerable as well.233 One observer noted that despite the 
possible implications of Dodd–Frank on this SOX provision, 
“companies will still have to keep compliance programs in place, 
often at a significant cost.”234  
                                                                                                     
the Securities and Exchange Commission to direct the national securities 
exchanges and national securities associations (e.g., the New York Stock 
Exchange . . . ) to prohibit the listing of any security of a company that is not in 
compliance with th[e] [§ 301] requirement.”). It follows that because companies 
remain listed on the New York Stock Exchange they must have complied with 
section 301.  
 229. See OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY OF THE 
SARBANES–OXLEY ACT OF 2002 SECTION 404 INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL 
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 4–5 (2009) [hereinafter SEC, REPORT], available at 
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/sox-404_study.pdf (stating the mean compliance 
costs for companies with a “public float” above $75 million was $2.33 million per 
year). 
 230. See In re DVI Inc., Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 196, 212 (E.D. Pa. 2008) 
(“[P]ublic float, [is] defined as the percentage of a security held by the public as 
opposed to company insiders . . . .”). Investorwords.com defines this term as, 
“The portion of a company’s outstanding shares that is in the hands of public 
investors, as opposed to company officers, directors, or controlling-interest 
investors.” Public Float, INVESTORWORDS.COM, http://www.investorwords.com/ 
3936/public_float.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 231. SEC, REPORT, supra note 229, at 4–5.  
 232. Id. at 5.  
 233. See Kathy Gurchiek, Sarbanes–Oxley Compliance Costs Rising, HR 
MAGAZINE, Jan. 2005, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3495/ 
is_1_50/ai_n8699080/ (“Dealing with whistle-blowers might not be the most 
expensive element of complying with Sarbanes–Oxley. But it must be taken 
seriously or the consequences could be costly . . . .”). The article continues, 
“There also . . . are soft costs to the organization, such as potential loss of 
business momentum and focus. The chief financial officer, for example, may be 
less available for normal work duties because he or she is dealing with whistle-
blower-related activities.” Id.  
 234. Peter J. Henning, The S.E.C., Whistle-Blowers and Sarbanes–Oxley, 
DEALBOOK.NYTIMES.COM (Nov. 9, 2010, 1:35 PM) http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2010/11/09/the-s-e-c-whistleblowers-and-sarbanes-oxley/ (last visited Apr. 10, 
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With these facts in mind, the SEC should promulgate a rule 
for the Dodd–Frank program requiring all whistleblowers to first 
file an internal report with their company before becoming eligible 
for an award.235 It seems patently illogical to require all publically 
held companies to institute internal reporting systems, at great 
cost to the company, and then disincenitivize actual use of those 
same systems through the Dodd–Frank program.236 Even the SEC 
has stated that it wanted “to implement [Dodd–Frank] in a way 
that encourages strong company compliance programs.”237 An 
internal reporting requirement would effectuate that policy.238  
Additionally, an internal reporting requirement would not be 
inconsistent with other SEC programs. Under Section 10A of the 
Exchange Act,239 when a registered public accounting firm, 
performing an audit of a public company’s financial statements, 
becomes aware of information that an illegal act “has or may have 
occurred,” the accounting firm must first inform the company’s 
audit committee.240 If the audit committee fails to take adequate 
action, the accounting firm must then inform the board of 
directors.241 Only if the board of directors then fails to report the 
                                                                                                     
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 235. This recommendation is explored more fully infra Part IV.C.  
 236. Several of the comments received by the SEC to the proposed rules 
advocated similar rules. See, e.g., BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, COMMENTS ON 
PROPOSED RULES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS OF SECTION 
21F OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 6 (2010) [hereinafter BUSINESS 
ROUNDTABLE, COMMENTS], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-
10/s73310-142.pdf (recommending an “internal reporting [requirement] where a 
company has a SOX-compliant procedure”). Business Roundtable consists of “an 
association of chief executive officers of leading corporations with a combined 
workforce of more than 12 million employees” and “nearly $6 trillion in annual 
revenues.” Id. at 1. Several other comments made similar recommendations.  
 237. SEC, Proposed Rules, supra note 23, at 70496.  
 238. See infra Part III.D.3 (explaining the policies underlying internal 
reporting requirements and explaining why the existence of such a requirement 
would lead to better company compliance).  
 239. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006) 
(establishing an internal reporting requirement for registered public accounting 
firms performing audits on publically held companies).  
 240. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b)(1)(B).  
 241. See id. § 78j-1(b)(2) (“If, after determining that the audit committee . . . 
is adequately informed . . . the registered public accounting firm concludes 
that . . . the senior management has not taken . . . timely and appropriate 
remedial actions . . . the registered public accounting firm shall, as soon as 
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violation to the SEC may the accounting firm report directly to the 
SEC.242 Shareholder derivative suits echo a similar pattern of 
internal reporting. In that context, the shareholder must first 
make a demand of the board of directors that it pursue the claim or 
justify why such a demand is excused before the shareholder can 
pursue the action on his own.243 
2. State Internal Reporting Requirements 
Internal reporting requirements are also seen in a variety of 
other state contexts, apart from those seen in the state FCAs.244 
Ohio, for example, requires internal reporting to one’s employer of 
violations of state or federal law as a prerequisite to reporting to 
government officials and for successfully litigating a retaliation 
claim.245 Similarly, Florida law requires the employee to first “in 
writing, [bring] the activity, policy, or practice to the attention of a 
supervisor” and afford “the employer a reasonable opportunity to 
                                                                                                     
practicable, directly report its conclusions to the board of directors.”).  
 242. See id. § 78j-1(b)(3) (“An issuer whose board of directors receives a 
report under paragraph (2) shall inform the Commission . . . . If the registered 
public accounting firm fails to receive a copy of the notice [informing the 
Commission] . . . the registered public accounting firm shall . . . furnish to the 
Commission a copy of its report . . . .”). 
 243. See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del. 1996), abrogated on 
other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (“A stockholder 
filing a derivative suit must allege either that the board rejected his pre-suit 
demand that the board assert the corporation’s claim or allege with particularity 
why the stockholder was justified in not having made the effort to obtain board 
action.”). For an overview of pre-suit demands, see generally Robert K. Wise, 
Demand Futility in Shareholder-Derivative Litigation Under Texas Law, 28 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 59 (1997). Although shareholder derivative suits typically arise 
under state law and therefore are not governed by the SEC, these suits often 
relate to securities fraud or breaches of fiduciary duties by company directors 
and therefore are applicable to the Dodd–Frank program.  
 244. See supra notes 196–99 and accompanying text (describing State FCAs 
with internal reporting/exhaustion requirements).  
 245. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52(A)(1)(A) (West 2011) (“[T]he 
employee orally shall notify the employee’s supervisor or other responsible 
officer of the employee’s employer of the violation and subsequently shall file 
with that supervisor or officer a written report that provides sufficient detail to 
identify and describe the violation.”); id. § 4113.52(D) (“If an employer takes any 
disciplinary or retaliatory action against an employee as a result of the 
employee’s having filed a report under division (A) of this section, the employee 
may bring a civil action . . . .”).  
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correct” the violation before retaliation protection attaches.246 New 
York has a nearly identical law to Florida’s.247 
Other states, in requiring internal reporting, carve out 
exceptions that are applicable in the Dodd–Frank context. Maine 
also withholds retaliation protection from reporting employees who 
do not first bring the violation to the attention of their employer.248 
Maine waives this exclusion, however, if “the employee has specific 
reason to believe that reports to the employer will not result in 
promptly correcting the violation.”249 New Jersey also has an 
exclusion to its mandatory reporting law where “the employee is 
reasonably certain that the activity, policy or practice is known to 
one or more supervisors of the employer or where the employee 
reasonably fears physical harm as a result of the disclosure 
provided, however, that the situation is emergency in nature.”250 
Alaska also requires internal reporting, but it is waived in four 
situations: where the employee reasonably believes (1) reports to 
the employer will not result in prompt action to remedy the 
matter; (2) the activity, policy, or practice is already known to one 
or more supervisors; (3) an emergency is involved; or (4) fears 
reprisal or discrimination as a result of disclosure.251  
                                                                                                     
 246. FLA. STAT. § 448.102 (2011).  
 247. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 740(3) (McKinney 2011) (“The protection against 
retaliatory personnel action . . . shall not apply to an employee who makes such 
disclosure . . . unless the employee has brought the activity, policy or 
practice . . . to the attention of a supervisor of the employer and has afforded 
such employer a reasonable opportunity to correct . . . .”); see also DANIEL P. 
WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY 
DISCHARGE 69–70 (2d ed. 2004) (listing, in addition to the above, Arkansas, 
Idaho, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Wyoming, Colorado, and North Carolina as all 
requiring either prior internal reporting or notice to the employer before 
external reporting is permitted).   
 248. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, § 833(2) (2011) (“Subsection 1 does not apply 
to an employee who has reported . . . unless the employee has first brought the 
alleged violation, condition or practice to the attention of a person having 
supervisory authority . . . and has allowed the employer a reasonable 
opportunity to correct that violation . . . .”).  
 249. Id. 
 250. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-4 (2011) (“The protection against retaliatory 
action provided by this act pertaining to disclosure to a public body shall not 
apply to an employee who makes a disclosure . . . unless the employee has 
brought the activity . . . to the attention of a supervisor . . . .”).  
 251. ALASKA STAT. § 39.90.110(c) (2011).  
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Clearly the experience of the states supports prior internal 
reporting. These provisions are even harsher than would be 
applicable in Dodd–Frank, as they prevent employees from 
qualifying for retaliation protections,252 whereas the internal 
reporting requirement advocated here would simply prevent the 
whistleblower from collecting a bounty.253  
3. Public Policies Supporting Internal Reporting  
Chiefly, an internal reporting requirement would support the 
main public policies which underlie any whistleblowing system on 
the macro level. First and foremost, the primary goal of any 
whistleblower provision should not be the punishment or 
harassment of employers by whistleblowers with intrinsic conflicts 
of interest,254 but rather it should be the fast and effective 
correction of any wrongdoing.255 This sentiment is reflected in a 
host of scholarship. One pair of scholars noted: “[T]he primary goal 
of whistleblowing is reduc[ing] wrongdoing rather than the 
prosecution of wrongdoers, and the speed with which problems are 
addressed is significant.”256  
                                                                                                     
 252. See supra notes 245–51 and accompanying text (describing state laws).  
 253. See infra Part IV.C (describing further the internal reporting 
requirement).  
 254. See supra notes 168–72 and accompanying text (discussing the 
whistleblowers’ inherent conflicts of interest).  
 255. See Terry Dworkin & Elletta Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing: 
Protecting the Interests of the Employee, the Organization, and Society, 29 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 267, 285 (1991) (“Although prosecution may be a legitimate secondary 
goal of public whistleblower protection, it should not be permitted to hamper the 
primary objective of most whistleblowing statutes, which is to correct the 
wrongdoing as quickly and efficiently as possible.”).  
 256. Id. at 306. Cf. Larry DiMatteo & Don Wiesner, Academic Honor Codes: 
A Legal and Ethical Analysis, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 49, 83 (1994) (“[T]he primary goal 
of whistleblowing [or reporting honor code violations] is reduction of wrongdoing 
rather than the prosecution of wrongdoers . . . . Thus, if the violation can be 
prevented or the violator immediately confronted, then it is more likely that the 
harm to the individuals and to the institution will be minimized.” (citations 
omitted) (citing Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 255, at 306)); Raxak Mahat, A 
Carrot for the Lawyer: Providing Economic Incentives for In-House Lawyers in a 
Sarbanes–Oxley Regime, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 913, 932–33 (2008) (“The 
primary goal should be to get the information out at the earliest possible time so 
that transaction costs and shareholder losses are minimized and market 
confidence is not unnecessarily undermined.”); Sarah Baum, Note, Callahan v. 
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An internal reporting requirement would support this goal in 
a variety of ways. Internal reporting would allow the company to 
respond quickly to allegations that are the result of simple 
negligence, oversight, “some other easily corrected 
inadvertence,”257 or situations of legal nuance.258 In many cases 
upper management may not even be aware of the issues being 
reported.259 Internal reporting would allow companies to correct 
their own mistakes and avoid the need for significant, extended, 
and costly government intervention.260 In the Dodd–Frank context, 
                                                                                                     
Edgewater Care & Rehabilitation Center: The Illinois Whistleblower Act Does 
Not Preempt the Common Law Tort of Retaliatory Discharge, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 
161, 186–87 (2007) (“The primary goal of state whistleblower statutes is to 
correct wrongdoing.”); Trystan Phifer O’Leary, Note, Silencing the 
Whistleblower: The Gap Between Federal and State Retaliatory Discharge Laws, 
85 IOWA L. REV. 663, 663–64 (2000) (“The primary goal of many federal statutes, 
therefore, is not protection of the whistleblower. Rather, provisions protective of 
whistleblowers were included primarily as tools by which to advance the 
objectives of the legislation.” (citations omitted)).  
 257. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 247, at 39–40 (“[E]mployees 
should consider . . . whether improprieties simply were the result of negligence, 
oversight, mistake, or some other easily corrected inadvertence.”).  
 258. See Moberly, supra note 228, at 1156 (“[R]eporting errors could occur 
simply because an employee does not fully understand an ambiguous and 
complex situation in which it might be difficult to discern legal from illegal 
conduct.”); see also Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1760 (2007) (“Internal whistleblowing also enables the 
correction of misunderstanding, which reduces the likelihood that the 
organization and its employees will unfairly suffer harm.”); Kevin Runinstein, 
Note, Internal Whistleblowing and Sarbanes–Oxley Section 806: Balancing the 
Interests of Employee and Employer, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 637, 650 (2008) (“In 
a case where no actual wrongdoing occurred, internal whistleblowing would 
allow the employer to clarify the misunderstanding before negative information 
becomes public.”).  
 259. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 247, at 40 (“Attempts to 
informally resolve alleged violations may lead to correction of problems, and 
may prevent criminal prosecution of honest but ill-informed managers who 
would immediately correct problems if they knew about them.”); Terry Dworkin 
& Janet Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They Working?, 25 AM. BUS. L.J. 
241, 243 (1987) (“[T]op executives may actually be unaware of wrongdoing 
committed by subordinates; internal complaints give them a chance to stop the 
wrongdoing before it is made public.”).  
 260. See Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 992 F.2d 
474, 478–79 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Employees should not be discouraged from the 
normal route of pursuing internal remedies before going public . . . . [I]t is most 
appropriate, both in terms of efficiency and economics . . . that employees notify 
management of their observations as to the corporation’s failures before formal 
investigations and litigation are initiated . . . .”); David Culp, Whistleblowers: 
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this benefit would actually inure to the public, as immediate public 
disclosure would likely lead to significant negative press, thereby 
harming public shareholders through lowered share values.261 
Further, the requirement would also incentivize companies to 
create effective reporting and compliance mechanisms, as only 
where responsive and efficient systems are in place would the 
requirement preclude full public disclosure of the possible 
violation.262  
                                                                                                     
Corporate Anarchists or Heroes? Towards a Judicial Perspective, 13 HOFSTRA 
LAB. L.J. 109, 133 (1995) (“This would ‘give employers the initial opportunity to 
correct their own violations,’ and encourage resolution within the company.” 
(quoting Martin H. Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower from Retaliatory 
Discharge, 16 MICH. J. OF L. REFORM 277, 305 (1982))).  
 261. For a detailed discussion of how all publically available information 
integrates into stock price, see generally Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, 
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 554 (1984) (“The 
common definition of market efficiency, that ‘prices at any time ‘fully reflect’ all 
available information’ . . . .” (quoting Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A 
Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970))); see also 
Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2010) (“There are three 
versions of the efficient capital market hypothesis: weak, semi-strong, and 
strong.”) The court continues:  
The weak version is that prices incorporate information in a way that 
prevents the historical pattern of prices from being used to predict 
changes in price. In other words, it is not possible to identify any 
trading rule that beats the market. Everyone can observe historical 
prices; if information were there, sophisticated traders would use it, 
prices would adjust, and the past prices would cease to be 
informative. This implies that only someone with new information 
can make a trading profit. The semi-strong version adds that the 
value of new information is itself reflected in prices quickly after 
release, so that only the first recipient of this information (or someone 
with inside information) makes a profit; everyone else might as well 
ignore the information and rely on the prices. The strong version adds 
a claim that the price set in this way is right, in the sense that it 
accurately reflects the firm’s value.  
Id. at 685. 
 262. See Runinstein, supra note 258, at 652 (“Requiring internal disclosure 
as a first resort would also encourage organizations to develop effective 
reporting and compliance mechanisms to ensure that problems are corrected 
within the organization in order to avoid external disclosure.”); cf. Dworkin & 
Near, supra note 259, at 251 (“[T]he provisions encourage organizations to set 
up grievance procedures or other constructive ways of dealing with internal 
problems, for the bar to suit by employees exists only for those who do not make 
reasonable efforts to take advantage of what is available.”).  
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Reducing costs for all parties involved should also underlie 
any good whistleblower program.263 As explained above, the 
internal reporting requirement would screen out spurious claims, 
saving both the government (in the form of reduced investigative 
expenditures) and companies money. Whistleblowers may also use 
external reporting for bad-faith purposes, such as gaining an 
advantage in promotions or retaliating against the employer for 
some perceived slight.264 An internal reporting requirement would 
channel these complaints inward where they could be vetted more 
cheaply than by government investigation and avoid possible 
litigation and opportunity costs.265 
The SEC has expressed reticence in promulgating an internal 
reporting requirement, stating, “[W]hile many employers have 
compliance processes that are well-documented, thorough, and 
robust, and offer whistleblowers appropriate assurances of 
confidentiality, others lack such established procedures and 
protections.”266 An internal reporting requirement, however, would 
actually incentivize the establishment and use of such robust and 
thorough procedures.267 Companies subject to SOX are already 
mandated to have in place substantial internal reporting 
mechanisms,268 and any lack of internal systems would in no way 
                                                                                                     
 263. See Moberly, supra note 228, at 1153 (describing the costs associated 
with any whistleblower system, and finding that the SOX model of internal 
reporting “minimizes those costs and, where appropriate, reduces the costs of 
whistleblowing”).  
 264. See id. at 1156 (“Whistleblowers could use the system opportunistically 
to gain some sort of job security by disclosing imaginary misconduct, to achieve 
an advantage in promotion or salary by wrongly reporting a co-employee, or 
simply to hurt the employer in retaliation for some perceived slight.” (citations 
omitted)).  
 265. See id. (“[T]he costs of such erroneous claims include costs associated 
with internal investigations, litigation expenses, opportunity costs, potential 
penalties, and costs related to becoming a possible target for government 
regulators.”). The article continues, “The [SOX] Model can reduce the costs of 
whistleblowing errors, whether made maliciously or in good faith, because the 
Model channels whistleblower disclosures internally rather than externally. . . . 
[A] corporation that receives erroneous disclosures internally at least has the 
possibility of providing feedback and correct information to a whistleblowing 
employee.” Id. at 1156–57 (citations omitted).  
 266. SEC, Proposed Rules, supra note 23, at 70496.  
 267. See supra note 262 and accompanying text (describing how the 
requirement would lead to effective internal reporting systems).  
 268. See Sarbanes–Oxley § 301(4) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 
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preclude subsequent external reporting to the SEC by the 
whistleblower if the company fails to do so. Finally, the SEC’s 
concern about confidentiality could easily be remedied by having 
the whistleblower’s attorney file the internal report. Dodd–Frank 
itself requires anonymous whistleblowers to be represented by 
counsel.269 
While the SEC notes that it “does not intend for its rules to 
undermine effective company processes for receiving reports on 
potential violations,”270 the tremendous economic incentives 
provided for under the Dodd–Frank program do just that.271 The 
best way to ensure “thorough and robust”272 internal reporting 
systems is by not just allowing internal reporting but by requiring 
it. 
With all this in mind, a uniform rule would include a 
requirement that, for any whistleblower to become eligible for an 
award under Dodd–Frank, the whistleblower must first have filed 
an internal report and given the company a reasonable time to 
respond.273 The whistleblower’s counsel can fulfill this requirement 
if adequate confidential reporting systems are not in place. The 
                                                                                                     
(2006)) (“Each audit committee shall establish procedures for—(A) the receipt, 
retention, and treatment of complaints . . . .” (emphasis added)); Cherry, supra 
note 223, at 1069 (“This is not phrased in discretionary terms—every publicly 
traded company must have a system in place for receiving anonymous 
complaints.”).  
 269. See Dodd–Frank § 922(d)(2) (“Any whistleblower who anonymously 
makes a claim for an award under subsection (b) shall be represented by counsel 
if the whistleblower anonymously submits the information upon which the 
claims is based.”). 
 270. SEC, Proposed Rules, supra note 23, at 70496.  
 271. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, COMMENTS, supra note 236, at 2 (“[D]espite 
the Commission’s best intentions, its ‘Securities Whistleblower Incentives and 
Protection’ program is likely to significantly undermine established corporate 
compliance programs by giving employees a substantial financial incentive and 
no meaningful disincentive to bypass internal reporting mechanisms in pursuit 
of bounty payments from the SEC.”).  
 272. Id. 
 273. Nothing in this requirement should be interpreted as removing 
retaliation protection under Dodd–Frank from the putative whistleblower. See 
Dodd–Frank § 922(h)(1)(A) (“No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, 
threaten, [or] harass . . . a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of 
employment because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower—(i) in 
providing information to the Commission . . . .”). This suggestion only relates to 
removing the bounty incentive from whistleblowers that fail to file an internal 
report. 
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internal reporting requirement would be waived if the employee: 
(1) is reasonably certain that the employer will not make a good 
faith effort at remedying the violation, such as where the conduct 
implicates high-level supervisors (such as directors), or 
(2) reasonably believes an emergency is involved.274 
This recommendation would both further the policy goals 
underlying whistleblower provisions and reduce meritless reporting 
to the SEC by having the companies themselves screen spurious or 
ill-informed claims.275 In addition, this recommendation balances 
the interests of both whistleblowers and companies by requiring a 
presumptive duty to file an internal report but also recognizing that 
in certain circumstances such a barrier may be too high.276  
IV. Recommendations 
A synthesis of all this information leads to a few logical 
conclusions. Experience under the IRS whistleblower bounty 
                                                                                                     
 274. These exceptions are fairly similar to those seen above, supra note 250, 
in the New Jersey statute, about which one commentator stated, “The 
requirement gives employees the opportunity to voice any concerns they may 
have with their employers candidly and in good faith. It also gives employers the 
opportunity to inform employees about any potential misperception the 
employee has made about the relevant law or actual practice.” David Aron, 
“Internal” Business Practices?: The Limits of Whistleblower Protection for 
Employees Who Oppose or Expose Fraud in the Private Sector, 25 ABA J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 277, 295–96 (2010).  
 275. See supra note 257 and accompanying text (describing how internal 
reporting would lead to internal resolution of many disputes).  
 276. Some comments to the proposed rules made similar suggestions, 
including the exceptions to the duty. See, e.g., HUNTSMAN CORPORATION, 
COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE WHISTLEBLOWER 
PROVISIONS OF SECTION 21F OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 5 (2010), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/whistleblower/whistleblow 
er-74.pdf (“We strongly urge that the SEC impose upon a whistleblower a 
presumptive duty to report a potential violation to the company . . . .”). The 
comment continues:  
We recognize that there may be instances in which a whistleblower 
may not want to report to the company because of a concern that 
there will be retaliation or that senior management is . . . involved in 
the wrongdoing . . . . Thus, we suggest that the SEC . . . leave open 
the possibility that a whistleblower may be allowed to circumvent the 
company’s compliance process if there is a substantial, reasonable 
and legitimate reason to do so.  
Id. at n.1.  
1254 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1201 (2012) 
provision shows that reporting under Dodd–Frank is likely to 
increase markedly from that seen under the old § 78u program and 
is also likely to increase over time.277 In fact, David Rosenfeld, 
associate director of the SEC’s New York Regional Office, stated 
that his office has been “inundated” with tips and complaints 
under the newly enacted program.278 He expects “tons of these 
whistleblower complaints” and that “considerable resources and 
time” will be needed to sort out viable tips.279 This only reinforces 
the inference drawn from the IRS program’s reporting data that a 
major amount of reporting under Dodd–Frank should be 
expected.280 The IRS data also show that a major increase in 
collected penalties and payouts of bounties is imminent as well.281 
A. Reverse Attorney’s Fees 
Federal experience with the FCA illustrates that an extreme 
amount of meritless reporting should be expected.282 To combat 
this problem the SEC should promulgate rules disincentivizing 
meritless reporting under Dodd–Frank. Drawing on both federal 
and state FCA provisions,283 such a rule should state: Where the 
defendant is successful in defending a suit brought against it 
pursuant to information provided by a Dodd–Frank whistleblower, 
the government and the whistleblower shall be jointly and 
                                                                                                     
 277. See supra Part III.A (describing the IRS program and data).  
 278. Yin Wilczek, SEC to Take Advantage of New Powers to File Aiding, 
Abetting Charges, Official Says, 8 CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY REP. (BNA) 1224 (Nov. 
12, 2010).  
 279. Id.  
 280. See supra notes 75–85 and accompanying text (predicting significant 
reporting under Dodd–Frank).  
 281. See supra notes 75–85 and accompanying text (describing collection and 
payment data).  
 282. See supra notes 149–66 and accompanying text (describing meritless 
claims data).  
 283. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4) (2006) (“[T]he court may award to the 
defendant its reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses if the defendant prevails 
in the action and the court finds that the claim of the person bringing the action 
was clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for purposes of 
harassment.”); FLA. STAT. § 68.086(3) (2008) (“If the department does not proceed 
with an action under this act and the defendant is the prevailing party, the 
court shall award the defendant reasonable attorney’s fees and costs against the 
person bringing the action.”).  
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severally liable to the defendant for the costs of its reasonable 
attorney’s fees, if the suit is shown to have been frivolous.  
As noted in Part III.B, the “clearly frivolous” language of the 
federal FCA has been interpreted too narrowly in this context,284 
and thus this recommendation refers to the definition of “frivolous” 
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11.285 Using the Rule 
11 definition of “frivolous” provides a prepackaged standard with 
which lawyers and judges are both well aware and familiar.286 
B. Nurturing Unlawful Conduct 
Experience with the federal FCA also cautions that “nurturing 
unlawful conduct” will be an issue in the Dodd–Frank context as 
well.287 This phenomenon involves the incentive that 
whistleblowers in the bounty context have to delay reporting until 
                                                                                                     
 284. See, e.g., Pfingston v. Ronan Eng’g Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1006–07 (9th Cir. 
2002) (“The award of fees under the False Claims Act is reserved for rare and 
special circumstances.”). 
 285. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (establishing the effect of an attorney or 
unrepresented party’s signing of pleadings, motions, other papers, and 
representations to the court, and providing sanctions for frivolous assertions 
contained therein). The Rule states: 
[A]n attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the 
person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for 
any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or 
needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and 
other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a 
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing 
law or for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have 
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have 
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further 
investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions 
are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are 
reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.  
Id. 
 286. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1013, 1013 (1988) (“Rule 11 has become a significant factor in civil 
litigation . . . .”). “[T]he majority of the lawyers practicing in federal courts must 
be aware by now of the requirements of rule 11. This awareness has certainly 
deterred some frivolous, wasteful, or abusive litigation.” Id. at 1014–15.   
 287. See supra notes 168–72 and accompanying text (describing the concept 
of “nurturing unlawful conduct” in the FCA context).  
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damages have increased to the maximum amount.288 Because the 
whistleblowers’ compensation is tied directly to the amount of 
damages, the higher the damages, the greater their award.289  
To combat this, the SEC should promulgate a rule that 
reduces the whistleblowers award to the minimum percentage 
allowed by law if it is found that the whistleblower unreasonably 
delayed reporting the violation. Under the FCA, Congress has 
found it fit to cap the relator’s award at 10% if their claim was 
based on certain publically available information.290 The only 
award amounts that are appealable under Dodd–Frank, however, 
are those outside the 10%–30% range.291 Therefore, it seems 
unlikely that the SEC has the statutory authority to reduce the 
award below 10% for this kind of conduct. A congressional 
amendment to the program authorizing an award below the 10% 
minimum for unreasonably delaying whistleblowers should occur 
as well.  
C. Internal Reporting Requirement 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the realities of SOX 
and the experience of the states in the FCA and employment 
                                                                                                     
 288. Supra notes 168–72 and accompanying text. 
 289. Supra notes 168–72 and accompanying text. 
 290. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2006) (reducing the award to maximum of 10%). 
The text of the statute states: 
Where the action is one which the court finds to be based primarily on 
disclosures of specific information (other than information provided 
by the person bringing the action) relating to allegations or 
transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a 
congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office 
report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, the 
court may award such sums as it considers appropriate, but in no 
case more than 10 percent of the proceeds . . . .  
Id.  
 291. See SEC, Final Rules, supra note 35, at 34347 (“[W]hen the 
Commission makes an award between 10 and 30 percent . . . our final order 
regarding the amount of an award (including the award allocation among 
multiple whistleblowers) is not appealable.”); Dodd–Frank § 922(f) (“Any such 
determination, except the determination of the amount of an award if the award 
was made in accordance with subsection (b), may be appealed to the appropriate 
court of appeals of the United States. . . .”); supra notes 34–36 and 
accompanying text (describing the right of appeal).   
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retaliation contexts demonstrate that the SEC should promulgate 
an internal reporting requirement.292 This rule would require a 
presumptive duty for the whistleblower to report internally first 
and then allow a reasonable amount of time for the company to 
respond. The whistleblower’s counsel can fulfill this requirement if 
the company does not have adequate, confidential systems in 
place. The internal reporting presumption can be overcome in two 
situations, if the employee: (1) is reasonably certain that the 
employer will not make a good-faith effort at remedying the 
violation, such as where the conduct implicates high-level 
supervisors (such as directors), or (2) reasonably believes an 
emergency is involved.  
V. Conclusion 
By recognizing the inherent conflict in using a “rogue to catch 
a rogue,” this Note concludes that certain changes to the Dodd–
Frank whistleblower bounty program are necessary. Data 
compiled from the IRS and the Federal False Claims Act illustrate 
that a significant amount of meritless reporting is expected. To 
combat this, a reverse attorney’s fees rule is needed. Experience 
with the Federal FCA also illustrates that a major reduction in 
awards should occur for all whistleblowers that unreasonably 
delay reporting. Drawing on State False Claims Acts and the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act, an internal reporting rule is necessary to 
reduce further the transaction costs associated with meritless or 
otherwise unnecessary reporting. In sum, when using rogues to 
catch rogues, it is both necessary and appropriate to confine these 
whistleblowers somewhat so as to provide a check against the 
enormous economic incentive provided by whistleblower bounty 
programs.  
                                                                                                     
 292. See supra notes 218–76 and accompanying text (describing the 
requirements of SOX); supra notes 196–201 and accompanying text (discussing 
state FCA provisions with internal reporting requirements); supra notes 245–52 
(describing internal reporting requirements in state employment retaliation 
law).  
